

JPRS-UAG-86-028

27 OCTOBER 1986

USSR Report

AGRICULTURE

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AGRICULTURE

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MAJOR CROP PROGRESS AND WEATHER REPORTING

GRAIN HARVEST, TRANSPORT OPERATIONS IN KUSTANAY OBLAST

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Sep 86 p 2

Article by I. Abakumov, O. Pavlov, O. Stafashin and G. Shipitko, Kustanay Oblast: "How Reliable Is the Chain?"

Text The descriptive phrase "a sea of grain" suddenly took on exciting meaning. The hilly and seemingly elevated fields and meadows in the foothills of the Urals and the lakes of wheat framed by cheerful copses close by the Kazakhstan border. And for some two hundred kilometers -- grain and more grain. The Kustanay virgin land. Truly a sea.

The Kustanay grain fields occupy almost 4.3 million hectares. The harvest work is being completed in the south and there are rayons -- Mouszumskiy, Semiozernyy and Kamyshninskiy (3 of 14) -- which are close to fulfilling their plans. The center is completing its threshing of the first half of its grain. Meanwhile the north has threshed only one fifth.

It bears mentioning that it was the northern and some southern rayons which furnished assistance to the oblast last year in making up for the damage inflicted upon the farms by the summer drought. Thus our path this year takes us into the north. Prior to our trip here, we held a discussion with the chairman of the Kustanay Oblast Executive Committee K. Tyulebekov.

"The course of the autumn work was predetermined by the spring period. It was cold and for a long period of time the wild oats did not germinate. Nevertheless, our specialists decided not to hurry, to destroy the weeds and later to carry out the sowing work" stated Kasym Khazhibayevich, "A later sowing made it possible to avoid the summer drought conditions and everything would then be fine if the usual moderate weather prevailed subsequently. But in the middle of July, roughly for a month's time, almost the annual norm for precipitation fell in some rayons. Nevertheless, last year served to strengthen our belief that the specialists should be trusted and not rushed. Today we state just as we did at that time: the grain is needed and not merely the rates are at issue. I am confident that we will bring in the grain."

The sovkhozes Sevastopolskiy and Leningradskiy in Uritskiy Rayon are virgin land farms. Ukrainians drove the first peg into the ground of the Sevastopolskiy Sovkhoz and muscovites, representatives of the capital rayon of the same name, were the first to drive a peg into the land of the Leningradskiy

Sovkhoz. The leaders of the farms, N. Shevtsov and I. Ozheredov, have poor memories with regard to the virgin land. At the present time, they are both approximately 40 years of age.

Ozheredov, of the Leningradskiy Sovkhoz, has the rayon's largest grain field -- 28,000 hectares. One of the 22,000 Belorussian machine operators participating in the harvest work, N. Manko of the Kallich Sovkhoz in Gomel Oblast, stated:

"This sovkhoz is almost like our rayon."

The director is an engineer by education. But he knows the fields and he understands the grain and the situation. Nevertheless, the first word is spoken by the chief agronomist N. Marmut.

"The problem is clear and we must not touch the green grain. We must not be rushed. Specialists from the RAPO /rayon agroindustrial association/ arrive daily and hold consultations literally regarding each field. The situation is as follows: the weather is good at the present time and there is reason for us to wait somewhat. But will there suddenly be rain? Thus we are striving to obtain the golden mean. Each day the grain moisture content declines by 4-5 percent and I believe that tomorrow we can mow everywhere. But today we have almost achieved the planned mark for productivity -- 30 hectares per combine."

When these lines were written, the oblast's farms were operating at a high tempo: each day the grain was being cut down on 150,000 hectares and threshing work was being carried out for the same area. More than 90 percent of the combines were in operation. Never before had the Kustanay workers moved so many machines out onto the fields simultaneously. The machine operators were organized into 827 harvesting-transport complexes in which there were 18,000 combines and 1,000 technical servicing teams.

The workers in Kustanay Oblast possess experience in servicing their harvesting units in a sensible and intelligent manner. We became convinced of this fact at the Leningradskiy Sovkhoz. Combine operator N. Manko, who was already well known to us, related with some surprise how the repair workers quickly and without superfluous words corrected a problem in his combine. I scarcely had time to ask the brigade leader to glance at the brochure.

The secret of such efficiency is quite simple: a radio station with a link to the brigade leader's combine has been installed at the field camp. It bears mentioning that the repair workers in the rayons which we visited spend more time resting when out on the fields during the daytime. There were only a few equipment breakdowns. The main part of their work is carried out at night: adjustments, uncovering problems in the machines and preventive maintenance. But when a serious problem arises out on a field, assistance is furnished by the central repair workshop, which has a supply of replacement units.

"There were fewer down-times" we were informed by the chief of the Department for the Repair and Operation of the Transport Vehicle Pool of the oblast's agroprom B. Nosov, "but we still lack a sufficient number of electric power stations with a capability of from one to 30 kilowatts. And in the absence of such stations it is impossible to provide technical servicing at night directly

at a field camp; a machine must be brought to the department. There are also factors of another type which are affecting the harvesting rates. For example, today all of the fuel tanks are installed on a GAZ-52 motor vehicle, which clearly does not meet the requirements for the timely organization of harvest operations. The method of employing combines in large groups is in conflict with low-power equipment and low capacity fuel tanks. But industry continues to produce them. Thus there must be a fuel tank for each machine at a field camp and even when this condition is met it is not always possible to supply all of the combines with fuel in a timely manner.

However, the most vulnerable link in the harvesting chain, just as in the past, continues to be the use of motor vehicles from the field to the threshing floor and from the threshing floor to the elevator.

The director of the Kustanay Grain Products Combine R. Gilyazov was not satisfied:

"This is not the first year that we have experienced this situation. There are few machines at night and thus bedlam reigns between the hours of 10 P.M. and midnight. Grain is shipped to us from all parts of the oblast, although we are officially responsible for three nearby rayons."

Literally it was only one hour earlier than this that the head of the Industrial-Transport Department of the oblast party committee E. Adibekov had stated with conviction that it was hardly possible to organize transport operations any better than it was at the present time. One difficulty was mentioned: the oblast was allocated fewer machines than in past years. But, on the other hand, we are aware that the oblast was supplied with maximum possible assistance in the form of transport. Machines were withdrawn from important and urgent operations in Belorussia, the Ukraine and neighboring oblasts throughout the republic.

However, just how these machines are being used and exactly what their workloads are is another matter entirely. It turns out that the average statistical truck transports only 10-15 tons of grain during the harvest period, that is, it carries out 3-4 trips to the elevator. Certainly, a portion of the transport in the rayons is used for carrying out deliveries of silage bulk and potatoes. But this does not justify low output in the shipping of grain. The equipment is simply being utilized in accordance with antiquated methods. Machines coming into the oblast are being distributed among the rayons, later among the farms and subsequently among the brigades. In short, they are being scattered. The natural peasant stinginess precludes a brigade leader turning over his trucks, even if there is a limited amount of grain on the threshing floor. Instead of directing them to a closer elevator, they are driven over a distance of 150-180 kilometers. And when they return, they are once again filled.

We are still not accustomed to analyzing transport operations in the oblast. Thus, even in the central staff of the administration, shipments are recorded using rounded-off figures and special categories when counting the motor vehicles which arrive, for example, in hundreds or echelons. The machines are distributed with the same "accuracy."

The motor vehicle operators have maintained for a long period of time: the requirement for trucks decreases by a minimum of 25-30 percent in those areas where use is made of hourly schedules and where the vehicles arrive at the elevator on schedule both day and night. A seminar was recently conducted in Kustanay on this method and all who attended gave their approval. However, following the seminar they quickly dispersed and promptly forgot about it.

"And wrongfully so" stated the chief of the Shipping Department of Motor Vehicle Administration No. 2 M. Velichko, "The experience of our drivers alone reveals that whereas earlier there was one vehicle per combine, with the conversion over to schedules 0.75- 0.8 trucks appear to suffice. Their number would decrease even more if extensive use was made of trailers. I have in mind the batch and multiple-trailer method for transporting grain from a field, wherein the trailers stand on the plots along the edges of fields and the combine operators load them with grain and do not depend upon the use of vehicles."

This method did not come into use in the virgin land only yesterday. But it is still being introduced into operations only weakly. Today, for example, only 3,100 of 18,000 combines are provided with trailers.

There is one disturbing fact: are individual elements of the harvesting chain enduring the workloads?

The grain receiving enterprises in Kustanay Oblast cannot be referred to as a weak link. In recent years, new and spacious elevators have been placed in operation and the logistical base of the procurement specialists has been made considerably stronger. It is unfortunate however that, just as in the past, the relationships between the grain growers and the procurement specialists leave a great deal to be desired.

Kustanay Oblast is the largest supplier of strong wheats. Unfortunately, there are many barriers along the path to obtaining such grain. And it was by no means an accident that this year the farmers met with bewilderment the latest innovation by the Ministry of Grain Products.

This year the procurement specialists were instructed to accept, without limitations, the grain directly from the combines in keeping with the wishes of the farms. But, just as in the past, they are striving to lower the gluten content in the grain and they are overstating the weediness in an attempt to insure themselves against any eventuality. Thus a farmer is in no hurry to turn over his grain from a combine. He is prepared, so long as the conditions permit, to process it in the interest of obtaining a profit based upon the quality of the grain. This is dictated by the need to have grain waste scraps, which the farms are deprived of when the grain is turned over directly. The procurement specialists do not return such scraps to the grain growers. And they are of extreme importance with regard to augmenting the forage supplies of the farms.

But this is not all. Durum wheat has still not been delivered to the elevators. The farms withdrew 310,000 hectares of it and never before has such a small amount of this crop been sown. Durum wheat deliveries will be commencing and there may be some serious problems.

The chairman of the Fedorovka Put K Kommunizmu Kolkhoz, who is known for his ability to work with durum wheat, and his specialists have estimated that the farm may realize a profit of approximately 6 million rubles from sales of this year's crop. We were at the kolkhoz and thus we can state: the machine operators and brigade leaders are pursuing this goal and many more millions of rubles could be added to the kolkhoz's treasury if the wheat was accepted by the elevator as being of 1st class quality. Those in the oblast agroprom who know Gabun have no doubt but that he will achieve this goal.

He will achieve it. And what about the others? Indeed the stake in this game with the procurement specialists is high: for a ton of durum wheat, one can obtain from 150 to 600 rubles and if it is classified as ordinary wheat -- several times less. Indeed, the procurement specialists have their own "interest": to accept 1st class durum wheat and thus ensure their storage conditions. It is understandable that the more concern shown for condition, the fewer will be the demands. If the proper condition is maintained, then it is possible to achieve a high quality category and the difference in the prices -- purchase and sales -- can be converted into one's own profit. It is believed that the most important task of the oblast agroprom is that of providing the farms with maximum support and not to allow "golden" grain to disappear in a flow of ordinary grain.

Last year is recalled in this regard. At that time, the local newspaper LENINSKIY PUT published a report prepared by oblast organizations, which contained many superlative words and which was issued under the title "Labor Victory of the Oblast's Grain Growers."

The fulfillment of the plan for grain purchases by 101.1 percent can be considered as a victory and yet the victory was achieved not by durum or strong wheats but mainly by fodder barley, the plan for which was fulfilled by 182 percent. Meanwhile, the five-year task for durum wheat was not fulfilled by one half at the time. It is hoped that this year the grain balance will change visibly in favor of valuable grain.

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CSO: 1824/ 007

LIVESTOCK FEED PROCUREMENT

UZBEK FEED PROCUREMENT SHORTCOMINGS OF CONCERN TO PARTY

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 10 Aug 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Let's Accelerate Feed Production!"]

[Excerpts] The reorganization that has been begun in all spheres of our society's life and activity presupposes the complete application of efforts by everyone in his own place in improving production, the economy, and social development. This reorganization is inconceivable without accelerated movement forward, the mobilization of the resources and creative participation of the masses, the use of newer and newer reserves, the improvement of planning, administration, and management style, and the search for new paths and methods in developing all the branches of socialist production. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said at the conference of activists of the Khabarovsk Kray party organization, it is necessary for this reorganization to begin with each person individually, by each person's definition of his own civic position, with the increasing of political and labor activity and with the intensification of responsibility for the job that has been assigned and for the final results. It is necessary first of all to give oneself the task of doing everything conscientiously, with a large amount of responsibility to oneself and to the nation.

With this high gauge of demandingness toward the reorganization and the accelerated development of the republic, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan [UzCP] has considered the rate of feed procurement in the current year.

The relatively short duration of the feed procurements, the compressed periods of time for the vegetation of the feed crops, the lack of water this year, and the need to mobilize the equipment and manpower within the near future to the cotton fields of our republic -- all these things have required the feed procurement specialists to apply all their efforts as early as the very first spring days, and to display high responsibility and discipline, organizational spirit and order, and, finally, excellent results in creating a solid feed base for socialized animal husbandry, without which neither the summertime productivity of animal husbandry nor the successful forthcoming wintering-over period in the branch would be conceivable.

The task would seem to be clear. Especially since the CPSU Central Committee, as long ago as May, directed the attention of the republic's party organization to the unsatisfactory organization of feed procurements in Uzbek SSR. Even then it was important to begin promptly to carry out the "green harvest," and to increase its rates.

The party and Soviet agencies and the republic's agro-industrial committees and associations, in response to that criticism, developed additional economic-organizational measures. Their fulfillment made it possible to improve feed production somewhat. The areas planted to feed crops increased by 78,000 hectares, as compared with last year. In the feed-crop structure, perennial grasses occupied 63 percent. Steps were taken to prolong the operational periods of the green conveyor belt. With a plan for the repeated sowing of corn for silage on 45,000 hectares, the actual area sown was 60,000 hectares and it is planned to increase the area for these sowings to 139,000 hectares.

The intensification of the attention to feed production helped the animal husbandrymen to improve somewhat their contribution to the implementation of the Food Program. In the first seven months of the year, as compared with the same period last year, purchases of livestock and poultry increased by 4 percent; milk, 12; eggs, 7; wool, 6; and karakul, 2 percent. There was an increase in the average milk yields, egg-laying productivity, and heifer pregnancies, and a reduction in the number of hogs and cattle that died.

But, putting it bluntly, in a few places these planned successes were perceived with indifference. The party warns us against this. The need to exterminate this indifference and to take a self-critical approach to evaluating what has been achieved is required by the 27th CPSU Congress and the decisions of the June 1986 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and is also required by social development, which has been channeled into the path of reorganization and acceleration. The failure by certain party organizations and committees, subdivisions of the agro-industry, and the local Soviets and trade-union organizations to consider these principles has led to alarming results in feed production. This alarm is understandable — time is marching by, and in agricultural production it is difficult to make up for lost time. And frequently that time is wasted because of the lack of organizational spirit and responsibility; the loss of a sense of reality; complacency and indifference; and the underestimation of the seriousness of the situation that has been created as the summer comes to an end, under conditions of a shortage of water. It is precisely during this critically important time that many party rayon committees, rayon executive committees, RAPO [rayon agro-industrial associations], secretaries of primary party organizations, and most of the farm managers have lessened their supervision of the rate of feed procurements. Lesser quantities of coarse feeds have been procured, as compared with last year, on the farms of Dzhizak, Kashkadarya, Navoi, Samarkand, Surkhandarya, Syrdarya, Tashkent, and Khorezm oblasts and Karakalpak ASSR.

Cultivation of the republic's basic feed crop — alfalfa — has been poorly organized, and the harvesting of it for hay and green feed has been carried out inefficiently and without any supervision on many farms. Uzbekistan is

the traditional and ancient zone for the growing of this precursor of cotton. But the party committees and the specialists on the farms and in the subdivisions of Gosagroprom have greatly lessened their attention to alfalfa. In all oblasts that have at their disposal the technology for the harvesting of alfalfa in 5-7 days, there has been a delay of 2-3 weeks with the mowing, the mowing has been extended to as much as a month, and the alfalfa is mowed at the stage of mass flowering and even the formation of seeds, when the nutritive qualities have already been lost and it is impossible to restore the output of lost feed units. During the period between mowings, no mineral fertilizers are applied to the alfalfa fields, and they are not irrigated promptly, although water has been specially allocated for these purposes, and the attempt is made to cover over the mismanagement in this regard by showing excessive concern for irrigations of the basic crop — cotton. On a number of farms in Bukhara, Fergana, and Kashkadarya oblasts and Karakalpak ASSR, the alfalfa has been allowed to dry out. But the brigades from fraternal cotton-growing republics, which carry out reciprocal inspections here and have been working on the fields of Uzbekistan, have frequently mentioned the drowning of the cotton and the squandering of irrigation water. As a result, on certain farms the mowings of alfalfa yield no more than 10-15 quintals of hay per hectare. Moreover, the mown alfalfa lies for a long time in piles, losing its financial and nutritive value. And yet there exist progressive methods for laying in supplies of alfalfa hay, and they have been tested many times — pressing, active ventilation, shadow drying of the hay cuttings, and the preserving of the succulent feeds. But they are being used in insignificant volumes. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes have practically no hay sheds, and the storage facilities for succulent feeds have not been prepared everywhere by the beginning of the harvest. This irresponsibility directly harms the quality of the feeds. And their quality is more important than the notorious "gross," that is sometimes achieved at the expense of haloxylon, rush, and other weighty admixtures which are incapable of producing either milk or meat. And the already grown alfalfa which, if the technological schemes for laying in supplies of it were used efficiently, could yield the feed units that are so necessary to animal husbandry, loses its nutritive value because of the mismanagement. In Karakalpak ASSR more than 34 percent of the hay has been put in class III or substandard category; and in Dzhizak Oblast, almost 23 percent. On a number of farms, all the alfalfa hay that has been laid in is substandard. And this is the result of only a random determination of the quality standards of the hay. Ineffective use is being made of the well-extended network of oblast, inter-rayon, and rayon agrochemical laboratories, which have been called upon to protect the quality. In each oblast they inspect for quality standards no more than 30-35 percent of the hay that has been laid in, and there is no foundation for assuming that the uninspected feeds are any better than those that have been inspected. Therefore, in feed procurements, the "gross" continues to be the preferred indicator in the reports. And this is a direct path to the figure-paddings which to this very day have not been eliminated from feed production. The work on the "gross" in the procurement of feeds provides a loophole for subsequently writing off any conceivable and inconceivable quintals of inferior feed for the production of a nut of output. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the primary accounting of feed procurements has not been carried out properly everywhere.

In entire rayons, farms get along without any commodity invoices. Frequently the feeds are not weighed, but their volume is determined by eye. This leads to a misrepresentation of the true state of affairs.

The only way one can establish order into this matter is by the further introduction into feed production of the collective contract, of cost accountability, when the payment of the labor performed by the feed procurement specialists and the farm managers and specialists is made directly dependent upon the quantity and quality of the animal-husbandry output that is being sold to the state. This experience also exists in the country and in our republic. Gosagroprogram must study that experience in detail and introduce it on the farms.

The miscalculations in feed production reflect upon the everyday condition of animal husbandry.

Despite the availability of succulent and green feeds, almost none of them are given to cattle. There is practically no preparation of the feeds, and, practically speaking, the feed shops and feed kitchens do not operate during the summer. This reduces the productivity of the dairy herd and has been a reason why the republic has not fulfilled the half-year plan for milk production. It is possible right now to enrich the rations with feed beets. But those beets have not been provided to the dairy herd — the digging up of the roots has been carried out in only a few places. Something else that has been dragging out is the laying in of supplies of corn for silage, as a result of which many farms are suffering losses in the harvest yield of this valuable feed crop. The harvesting equipment sometimes stands idle, and the productivity of the operating combines is extremely low. As a result, the republic has laid in supplies of only slightly more than 400,000 tons of silage — less than 9 percent of the plan. And in Bukhara, Dzhizak, and Navoi oblast that indicator is even lower — respectively 1.4, 4.1, and 7.2 percent.

An important reserve for supplementing the feed reserve under the republic's conditions is the carrying out of repeated and intermediate sowings during the autumn and even during the winter. But the time for these sowings is passing by, and the repeated crops have been planted only on half the areas. And, practically speaking, not a single oblast has begun to sow any intermediate crops — rape, "perko," Triticale, and legume-cereal mixtures.

All these questions in feed production are fraught with irreplaceable losses for animal husbandry. They are irreplaceable if, within the near future, order is not introduced into the production and procurement of feeds, in the style and methods of managing the branch. And primarily, as is required by our time, it is necessary to hold strictly accountable those who guilty of failures in work wherever incompetency, indifference, irresponsibility, and lack of supervision have become the reasons for this failure. As was already reported in the press, the Bureau of the UzCP Central Committee has subjected to sharp criticism the party, Soviet, and economic managers who were guilty of disrupting the feed procurements this year. As a result of their failing to provide management, secretary of the Navoi Oblast party committee Ya. A. Sultanov and chairman of the oblast Agroprom B. Nurulpayev were relieved of their duties. A strict reprimand was given to First Secretary of the party's

Turkul'skiy Rayon Committee G. N. Khadzhiyev. The party managers of many rayons have been punished for the extremely unsatisfactory organization of operations in the production and procurement of feeds.

Reacting to this in a party manner means taking steps everywhere for the immediate correction of errors in feed production, and, within the shortest periods of time, giving the branch the acceleration without which it would be inconceivable to make up for what has been lost. The party committees and the Soviet and economic agencies in the outlying areas must, without any vacillation, analyze the state of affairs on every farm, in every brigade, must take under their supervision all the work of producing and procuring feeds, and establish strict accounting and reporting in this matter. It will be necessary to make significantly greater demands on the cadres at this administrative level, to hold strictly accountable the persons who are guilty of the failure in the branch, and to assign that job to persons who are competent and responsible.

The party's oblast and rayon committees, the Soviet and economic agencies, and the subdivisions of Gosagroperm must increase their demandingness toward the cadres for creating a solid reserve of feeds for the forthcoming wintering-over period, and must eliminate the mismanagement in the use and storage of feed resources. It is necessary to reorganize fundamentally the work of producing and procuring feeds on the basis of the introduction of advanced experience and technological schemes, and the achievements of scientific-technical progress and agronomic science, and to concentrate the attention of every worker in the branch on the intensification of the cultivation of the feed crops, especially alfalfa and corn, and irrigating and fertilizing them, and on reducing the cycles between harvest and obtaining high harvest of hay and succulent feeds while retaining their good quality. It is necessary to establish everywhere rigid supervision over the rates of harvesting of corn for silage, and to guarantee the assignments for the sowing of repeated and intermediate crops. It is necessary to plant those crops not only in the planned areas, but also on land where there was a delay in the August sowing of alfalfa — in every specific instance it is necessary to approach this matter like an owner, and to display a scientifically substantiated approach to collective intelligence.

5075
CSO: 1824/441

LIVESTOCK

INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGY FOR HIGH MILK YIELD DISCUSSED

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 15 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by Professor A. Soldatov, doctor of agricultural sciences, correspondent member, VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin]: "Technology for High Milk Yields —In Search of a USSR State Prize"]

[Text] Several problems in the intensification of animal husbandry must be solved through the introduction of new and more effective technology to more completely realize existing livestock breeds' genetic potentials. The comprehensive development of intensive technology for milk production, which makes it possible for farms to obtain 6,000-7,000 kg of milk per cow annually and which has been nominated for a USSR State Prize, can serve as an example of the combination of science and production.

The inventors' collective at the Podmoskovye Scientific-Production Association (NPO) and farm specialists developed a program for the accelerated creation of highly productive herds, specific farm systems for feeding balanced rations to young animals, layouts for animal farm reconstruction and design proposals for the construction of new animal facilities.

The practical implementation of the intensive technology permitted the Nemchinovka Experimental Farm and the Podmoskovye NPO to obtain the country's highest annual milk production per cow — 7,684 kg. Farms in Odintsovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast average 4,779 kg from each of 12,500 cows.

In the past 5 years milk productivity from the herd of black spotted at the Nemchinovka has increased by 1,813 kg. Each quintal of milk requires only 85-86 feed units and not more than 3 person hours of labor.

Intensive technology has increased milk production profitability. At the Nemchinovka it has reached 34.7 percent and at farms in Odintsovskiy Rayon 43.8 percent.

The technology's high efficiency is attained by using both the inventors' theories of selection-breeding work and labor saving technology for keeping animals which does not require large capital investments for the reconstruction of existing animal farms, making it widely accessible.

The new breeds' genetic potentials can only be fully realized if there is a good feed base which takes into account the peculiarities of nutrition for livestock adapted to consume large amounts of coarse and succulent feeds, above all haylage, hay and silage. This, and the agro-zootechnical potentials of farms, were taken into account in developing the technology. Therefore, more than 10 feed units of such feeds are fed to livestock in any amount the animals desire and during the winter. Sixty to sixty-five percent of feed nutritional value is produced on the farms. Grain concentrates are fed within ration limits.

Intensive technology provides for massive increases in milk production and the full realization of genetic potentials for productivity among animals in all age groups. Feeding bulky and green feeds in any amount makes possible the following: optimal ration structure for animals in different physiological condition. mechanical feed distribution, 7,000-8,000 kg of milk per cow annually.

In order to increase dairy productivity, the technology makes provisions for using Holstein-Friesian bulls. This will permit 10-12 percent increases in milk production. Patterns in the effective use of Holsteins have been discovered. These depend upon milk yield in the initial herd and the presence of thorough-bredness for improving breeds in the descendants. This is an important selection value for developing a program to create highly productive herds and new types and breeds of dairy cattle. A new method is used to select cows to bear calves. The animals are not selected by pedigree, but by actual productivity after bearing the first calf. Selection efficiency is increased by 3-4 fold. The selection of cows by their own productivity, and the inclusion of 40-45 first calf heifers per 100 cows in the main herd and the selection of 20-25 of the best to replace other animals have become the basic factor in stable increases in milk yields at the Nemchinovka Farm and in Odintsovskiy Rayon.

Technology for the intensive raising of replacement heifers is based upon the economical (380 kg) use of milk feeds, abundant coarse and succulent feeds and the free pen keeping of young animals on slotted floors throughout the entire raising period. This improves labor productivity 2-3 fold and creates more comfortable conditions for the animals. By the time of insemination at 16-18 months the heifers weigh no less than 380-400 kg. By using this technology to raise black spotted breeds, they produce 6,000-6,200 kg of milk during the first lactation, while Holstein crossed animals produce 7,000-7,200 kilograms of milk.

Improvements in the stall keeping system have reduced, by 2-3 fold, the amount of manual labor in removing manure and caring for the animals. Design improvements have been made in the transporter for removing manure from the barn, making it possible to increase reliability and service life 7-8 fold and to reduce the energy intensiveness of manure removal. The USSR Agroprom Scientific-technical Council has recommended the introduction of the modernized stall equipment and manure removal systems.

The inventors' collective did a great amount of work on the intensive technology's introduction. Productivity per cow exceeds 5,000 kg at farms in Odintsovskiy Rayon. Twenty-one of 40 animal farms in the rayon obtained more than 5,000 kg per cow, 5 more than 6,000; 182 of 370 milkers in the rayon obtain milked than 5,000 kg per cow, 54 of these more than 6,000 kg and 7 more than 7,000 kg. The highest yields in 1985 were obtained by A. D. Larchen'eva, — 8,175 kg, Z. G. Zagorodneva — 8,144 kg, and by A. N. Makarchukova, 8,086. These milkers, all from the Nemchinovka Experimental Farm, have 35-37 cows each.

The USSR Agroprom approved the Nemchinovka Experimental Farm's nonexhibition demonstration. Delegations of managers and specialists from many of the country's oblasts, krays and republics are constantly coming to the Nemchinovka to get acquainted with work on the intensive technology.

On the basis of what has been said one can state that the intensive technology for milk production developed by the collective of scientists and production specialists, which enables farms to increase milk cow productivity to 6,000 - 7,500 kg, is of major national economic importance in solving the country's Food Program and deserves a USSR State Prize.

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CSO: 1824/431

LIVESTOCK

PROCUREMENT PRICE MARKUPS ON CATTLE, MILK EXPLAINED

Minsk SELSKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO BELORUSSII in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 28-29

[Article by N. V. Soroka, department chief, USSR Ministry of Finance:
"Incentives Markups for Selling Livestock and Milk to the State"]

[Text] A set of measures to strengthen the economies of sovkhozes, kolkhozes and other agricultural enterprises, to create stable economic conditions for increasing the production and sales of agricultural products to the state is being systematically implemented in our country. Purchase prices for livestock and milk have been repeatedly increased, and markups and discounts established to give incentives for improving product quality.

In 1981-1985 kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises and associations were given markups (50 percent over purchase prices) for the sale of livestock and milk to the state above the average levels attained in the 10th Five-Year Plan. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Further Improvements in the Economic Mechanism in the Country's Agro-Industrial Complex" provides that in the 12th Five-Year Plan the 50 percent markups will be paid for exceeding the average levels in the 11th Five-Year Plan. That is, the previously set markup will be retained. Unfortunately, practical experience shows that not all agricultural enterprise managers and farm economic service workers know the basic points of existing legislation involving the procedure for paying the 50 percent mark-up. In some cases, the documents for obtaining it are incorrectly filled out and they are not given to the appropriate processing industry enterprises on time. As a result, farms fail to receive important incentives payments, and thus lose the right to obtain them. Because of this, the conditions for obtaining the 50 percent markups should be mentioned.

The average level of agricultural product sales to the state attained in a five-year plan is defined as the sum of products in standard weight, for 5 years, divided by 5. The total volume of products sold to the state includes all agricultural products counted towards fulfillment of the 1981-1985 plan for state sales. Total sales of products to the state above the average level attained in the 11th Five-Year Plan are defined as the difference between the volume of products sold to the state and counted towards fulfillment of the current year's purchase plan and the average level of sales during the previous five-year plan. Sales volume above the average level is defined as

the total of all livestock and poultry counted towards fulfillment of the purchase plan. Changes in average level are allowed only in those cases of farm land use approved by superior republic or oblast directive. In such cases a correction is made in the average annual volume and assortment proportional to the changes in the sales plan for the farm involved.

We will use an example to explain this. During the 11th Five-Year Plan at Kolkhoz No. 1 the average levels of sales were 20,000 quintals of milk and 10,000 of livestock. The animal product sales plan for 1986 was initially set at 25,000 quintals of milk and 12,000 quintals of livestock. In February 1986, following a decision by the oblast soviet of people's deputies, 430 hectares of agricultural land were transferred from Kolkhoz No. 1 to Kolkhoz No. 2, reducing the first kolkhoz's plan for milk sales to the state by 5,000 quintals and its livestock sales plan by 2,000 quintals and correspondingly increasing the plans for Kolkhoz No. 2. This makes it necessary to reduce the average level of milk sales at Kolkhoz No. 1 by 4,000 quintals

(5/25 x 20)

and of livestock sales by 1,600 quintals (2/12 x 10) and correspondingly increase the average levels of milk and livestock sales at Kolkhoz No. 2.

If during the 11th Five-Year Plan there was consolidation or association of farms, then the average annual level of sales for the associated farm is defined by adding the actual output sold and then dividing by the number of years the sales took place. For farms formed by splitting up of other lands during the current five-year plan, the average level of output sales is calculated by dividing the average level of the split up farm proportionally to the purchase plan for various types of output (similarly to the example above).

Sovkhozes created on land newly introduced into agricultural use and farms for which livestock and milk sales plans have been established for the first time are, for the first three years, paid a 50 percent markup over the purchase prices for selling products above the plan, and in subsequent years the markup is paid for product sales above the average level attained during the past three years. Farms which have not sold the state livestock, poultry, milk and dairy products, and which do not have sales plans for them are paid procurement prices plus a 50 percent markup for all products they sell the state.

Existing legislation authorizes sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises and recommends that kolkhozes sign strictly voluntary contracts with citizens living on their lands to raise and sell livestock and poultry, surplus milk which are subsequently sold to the state. Such output is counted towards the farms' fulfillment of their state plan for the sales of agricultural products. Markups are paid for qualitative and quantitative indicators. Livestock and poultry purchased by kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises and associations on the basis of contracts with the population and then sold to the state are counted the total volume of current year's sales to calculate the 50 percent markup.

Livestock and poultry which kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other farms purchase from the population without signing contracts for their raising and sell to the state without feeding are not counted as output sold over the average level. Total earnings from such output are not included in totals for calculating the 50 percent markup.

Animals, which between the day of noncontract purchase and their sales to the state did not reach the two month norm for weight gain called for by the farm's production-financial plan, are counted as sold without feeding and are not included towards obtaining the 50 percent markup.

For state animal husbandry complexes and poultry factories put into operation during the current five-year plan the average level of sales to the state is determined by dividing the amount of output sold to the state beginning with the last normative year for mastering designed capacity for output sales by the amount in these years, including the last normative year of mastery.

The last normative year is considered to be the planned year for attaining full designed production capacity. The beginning of mastering the designed capacity of a complex (poultry factory) is the date of signing the document putting it into operation.

These provisions apply to state agricultural enterprises having large state animal complexes (for beef production — 10,000 and more head), for swine — 54,000 and more head), and for poultry factories in the USSR Ptitseprom system which are allocated mixed feeds from state resources. Farms having smaller capacity state complexes are paid 50 percent markups on a common basis.

During the period they are mastering their designed capacity, state animal complexes and poultry factories are paid a 50 percent markup over purchase prices for output sold above the annual plan, while in subsequent years the markup is paid for sales above the level in the last normative year for mastering designed capacity. The effect of this provision is taken into account in calculating the 50 percent markup from the time designed capacity is mastered and in the introduction of reconstructed facilities if, as a result of reconstruction, there is an increase in a poultry factory's designed capacity. If, during reconstruction worn out buildings, installations and equipment are replaced without increasing capacity, and auxiliary buildings and installations, roads, railroad tracks and other improvements are built on poultry farm's grounds, then the markup on the purchase price during the reconstruction period and after the beginning of the reconstructed or new facilities is made by the common procedure, i. e. for output sold above the average level.

Feedlots at livestock procurement organizations, as well as interfarm enterprises engaged in state livestock purchases, feeding and subsequent sales of the fattened animals to the state as part of their state plan for the sales of such animals, are paid the 50 percent markup on weight gain above the level in the preceding five-year plan.

The form showing the average level for livestock and milk sales to the state attained during the five year plan is based upon documents showing the sales

of products to the state (sales receipts, acceptance documents, and others). The state inspectorate for the purchase and quality of agricultural products, rayon agro-industrial associations and state statistics inspectors for rayons transfer this to the rayon state inspectorates for each procurement organization (contractor), kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and other agricultural enterprise and association. One copy of this form should be kept at the rayon state inspectorate.

The volume of agricultural product sales to the state above the average level is defined as the difference between the the volume sold to the state and counted towards current year plan fulfillment and the average level for the five-year plan. If a farm makes sales to several contracting procurement organizations, the markup is paid by the main procurement contractor. This is determined by the State Procurement Inspectorate and an appropriate entry made in the document.

The basis for paying the 50 percent markup above purchase prices for output sold to the state over the average level is a document on the sales and purchase of above plan amounts of the output. This document is compiled by the farm and the procurer (contractor) and approved by the rayon agro-industrial association, rayon state statistics inspectorate and the rayon State Inspectorate for the purchase and quality of agricultural products. Such a document on the sales of livestock and milk is compiled no later than 15 days after the completion of the farm's sales for the current year. This document indicates the average level of sales above which the 50 percent markup is paid, the quantity sold and included in the output plan, the quantity sold above the attained level and the total payments of 50 percent markup.

For livestock the 50 percent markup is calculated from the annual average purchase price (payment), based upon actual earnings from livestock and poultry sold to the state. The calculation of total payments includes all markups and discounts for quantitative and qualitative indicators. It also includes farms' earnings from rabbit and poultry meat sales to procurement organizations at purchase prices. The annual average purchase price (payment) for livestock, is determined by dividing total payments the farm obtains from selling livestock and poultry to the state (excluding earnings for breed livestock and poultry and for the sales of meat to public food service and to workers and employees at sovkhozes and other state farms) by the live weight of the livestock and poultry sold to the state (minus the live weight of breed livestock and poultry and the sales of meat to public food service and to workers and employees at sovkhozes and other state farms).

In their calculations of purchase prices per quintal of livestock and poultry, farms participating in interfarm cooperation include the weight and value of output sold to the interfarm enterprise going towards plan fulfillment by the participating farm. This is based upon certificates issued by the interfarm enterprise, kolkhoz or sovkhoz performing these functions. This certificate shows the quantity and value of livestock and poultry counted towards the fulfillment of the firms' sales plans. The value of these livestock and poultry is determined from the average payments per unit of output for the entire interfarm enterprise, kolkhoz or sovkhoz performing the functions.

For milk and dairy products the 50 percent markup is calculated from the average annual purchase price (payment). The average purchase price (payment) is obtained by dividing total earnings -- this includes all markups and discounts for qualitative indicators (excluding total earnings from milk and dairy product sales to public food service and to workers and employees at sovkhozes and other state farms) -- by the weight of output sold to the state (excluding the weight of milk and dairy product sales to public food service and to workers and employees at sovkhozes and other state farms).

When selling milk and cream as part of the state plan directly into the trade system, public food service enterprises, childrens' medical and other institutions the 50 percent markup is calculated from the purchase price of these products for kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises and associations with purchase prices for milk and cream approved at the level of retail prices minus trade markups and discounts or at higher levels

The payment, to kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises and associations, of the 50 percent markup over purchase price for state sales above average levels is made by procurement organizations and enterprises (contractors) according to the year's results and is not later than the 15th day after results are totalled up, but not beyond a month after completion of sales. If the payment is not made within the indicated time the farm has the right to obtain it in the established procedure, i. e. within the first quarter of the current year. In addition, upon substantiated application, a kolkhoz, sovkhoz or other agricultural enterprise or association can obtain the 50 percent markup by authorization from the Belorussian Minister of Finance up until 1 July of the year following the report year.

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CSO: 1824/429

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

EFFECTIVENESS OF FAMILY CONTRACT SYSTEM CONSIDERED

Moscow Oblast

Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 34, Aug 86 p 17

Article by F. Bogomolov: "A Family Contract"

Text It was only recently, a year or two ago, that a discussion took place among agrarian specialists concerning family contracts. As a rule, many of these individuals were skeptical with regard to the use in social production of this form for labor organization and stimulation. And there were some who, armed with political-economic arguments, tried to prove on the whole the unacceptability of this method under modern conditions associated with agricultural development throughout the country.

But time has passed. The term family contract is now not only found in economic terminology but, even more important, it has become a firm element of practical life. Moreover, experience is at hand which serves to confirm its high effectiveness, especially in livestock husbandry. Does this now mean that everything is now clear with regard to the organization of a family contract?

At the Moscow Vereyskiy Sovkhoz, there is a small livestock farm for 50 dairy cows which is operated by one family under contractual conditions. The organization of labor on this farm, its economy and even the place on which it was built give cause for reflection.

First and Foremost -- Living and Working Conditions

The director of the sovkhoz, Viktor Petrovich Nikonenko, during a discussion with me, expressed his opinion regarding a contractual family farm and the characteristics of the geographic and socio-economic conditions of the farm. He enjoined me to study the heart of the matter and to draw my own conclusions.

"Our sovkhoz has 17 populated points" he stated, "They are widely dispersed throughout the territory. In many villages there are 2-3 homes containing able-bodied workers. The heart of the problem consists of attracting them to production and stemming the flow of the rural population to the cities."

I expressed my own opinion: this cluster of problems will not be resolved by one family contract. Moreover, it is highly possible that a family which undertook to operate on the basis of a contract, for example for the fattening of cattle, will achieve a special status. To a certain degree, this will disrupt the psychological climate in a village.

"This is true," agreed the director. "Actually, of the different organizational forms available for collective, family and individual contracts, we must select those which will be most compatible for the existing demographic structure in a particular village."

"In my opinion," he continued, "one of the chief trends in our work aimed at improving the use of labor resources and retaining personnel in the rural areas is that of creating more favorable production and domestic conveniences for the livestock breeders and farmers and particularly for the machine operators. Indeed, a great volume of work falls on their shoulders. Each farm has different methods available for achieving this goal. Our sovkhoz specializes in the production of milk. We have three farms, each with 400 cows. We have introduced double-shift operations and the collective contract. We have installed showers, recreation rooms and even saunas on the farms. These seemingly "minor" domestic facilities are considered to be strong factors with regard to attracting youth. Youth are beginning to augment the ranks of our livestock breeders."

An agreement was reached with a secondary school and promises were made: to graduates desiring to work on livestock farms, we will furnish housing and at first a guaranteed wage, but on the condition that they enter into a contract on the farm. Here we are no longer speaking about a family contract, but rather a collective or youth contract.

"An interesting thought," I stated, interrupting his discussion, "Moreover, it would be good if it was introduced into operational practice more rapidly. How is the development of the family contract proceeding?"

Viktor Petrovich stated with conviction: "Every opportunity must be employed in behalf of the problem. But the question is how? Here it is said that all factors must be weighed carefully. Meanwhile, the initial results of our only family contract are encouraging."

From An Economic Standpoint

After inviting me to visit the family farm, the director of the sovkhoz warned me that it was an experimental farm.

Compared to livestock facilities for 400-800 head of cattle, this farm appeared to be surprisingly small. Cleanliness and order prevailed. Above each stall there was a chart which displayed the productivity of a cow.

Not far from the farm there was a well organized two-story building. The head of the family, Antonina Afanasyevna Soldatova, together with her daughter-in-law, her son's wife, had concluded a contractual agreement with the sovkhoz's board of directors. They work together and furnish assistance to all members

of the family. The working and living conditions are satisfactory, although things did not go too well initially, particularly in their relationships with neighbors. However, the situation is normal at the present time.

The farm is small (50 dairy cows) and all of the principal technological processes are mechanized. The sovkhoz supplies feed in accordance with the contractual agreement at the rate of 1.18 quintals of feed units for the production of 1 quintal of milk. The family has a small wheeled tractor with pull-type attachments at its disposal for distributing feed and for carrying out other technological operations.

It would appear that all of the necessary equipment is in place here. And no complaints are being raised. But the fact that the farm is experimental causes one to stop and think. Various questions arise. First of all, why did they decide to build this farm here, not far from the central farmstead and very close to a lively settlement, rather than in a remote village where there are 2-3 homes with able-bodied workers? Secondly, why do the plans call for the farm to be supplied with feed only from the sovkhoz's resources?

I wish to explain the principle for organizing family farms. The opinion of the sovkhoz's director, Viktor Petrovich Nikonenko, is as follows: livestock farms which operate on a contractual (family) basis should be created in unpromising populated points, that is, in villages which have very few able-bodied workers. Opportunities are available for using empty buildings or modernizing them and for creating the required domestic conditions for families which agreed to work under contractual conditions.

It bears mentioning that the director has a reserve plan -- to create a contractual family farm in the unpromising village of Simbukhovo. Here there is a facility -- a former calf-house. It merely needs to be modernized. The home for a family of livestock breeders must be placed in proper working order. Generally speaking, the expenses should not be too great. And they will not influence greatly the production costs for the products.

In my opinion, this makes good sense. But once again a question arises with regard to the unpromising village. For example, no plans were made for installing a road or providing electricity and other domestic conveniences. And how can a family operate in behalf of a contract under such conditions? This is a problem. It is my opinion that careful thought must be given to the methods for solving it. Importance is attached here to taking into account the opinions of farm leaders and the agroprom leaders -- not only of Moscow Oblast but also other oblasts in the nonchernozem zone of Russia, where unfortunately the situation with regard to labor resources is not proceeding very well.

Let us now return to the experimental farm where a family is operating under contractual conditions. Lyudmila Nikolayevna Vasharina -- a sovkhoz economist -- supplied me with information which describes the production indicators of the family farm and the sovkhoz on the whole for the past 6 months. Allow me to cite some of the data (see Table on following page).

It is difficult to say what this data would be like if the family farm was located in a remote part of the sovkhoz and feed was supplied not from the farm's

resources but to a considerable degree by means of production. Nevertheless, the mentioned data confirms the effectiveness of the family contract. However, this is not meant to imply that the slogan: "Let's promote the family contract" should be displayed at each rural cross-road of villages located at some distance from the central farmsteads. In this work, nobody can propose a single recipe for the leaders and specialists.

	Family Farm		Sovkhoz Average	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
Milk yield per cow (kilograms)	1974	2998	1056	1373
Average daily milk yield (kilograms)	11.0	14.3	5.8	7.6
Expenses per quintal of milk				
Wages (rubles)	5.63	5.60	8.51	7.93
Feed (quintals of feed units)	1.18	1.11	1.37	1.14
Total direct expenses (rubles)	32.76	31.72	38.85	36.46

However, let us continue the discussion of the family farm headed by Antonina Afanasyevna Soldatova. Wages are organized somewhat differently here than they are under collective contract conditions at sovkhoz farms. The wage fund is determined based upon the expenditure norms for servicing a given number of livestock at a conventional sovkhoz farm. Dividing it by the planned milk production volume, we obtain the rate for 1 ruble of product sold (it equals 12.9 kopecks).

In addition, for realizing a savings in direct expenditures, a family receives 30 percent of the amount saved.

Let us now look at the computations. The construction of the farm cost 153,000 rubles, the dwelling -- 30,000, a hay barn -- 21,000 and a hay trench -- 12,500 rubles. The total cost amounted to 216,000 rubles. If we accept the fact that this farm (according to a statement by those participating in the family contract) will achieve a milk yield of 5,000 kilograms per cow, then the total cost, based upon existing purchase prices, will be repaid within 3-4 years. This is not all that bad. However, there are several "buts."

Which Method Is More Advisable?

As is known, livestock productivity is based not only upon proper tending but also upon the feed ration made available for the animals. I proposed the following situation to the sovkhoz director. A family farm was provided with feed the quality of which was lower than that needed for obtaining a definite amount of output. The family was justified (taking into account the contractual agreement) in submitting a complaint to the Board of Directors. How can the validity of such claims be revealed?

Instead of a reply, Viktor Petrovich set forth what in his opinion are some of the more acceptable conditions for a family contract in livestock husbandry. In his opinion, family farms should be allocated a definite land area for the

cultivation of forage crops. There will then be no cause for concern. One cultivates his crops, harvests them, preserves them, feeds them to the livestock -- and reaps the fruit of his own labor. It is precisely this trend which we would like to uphold when organizing family contracts in livestock husbandry, despite the fact that easy solutions are not being found in this work. Indeed, we are speaking here of a voluntary desire on the part of people to engage in some type of production under contractual conditions.

Certainly, there are many complications in the work concerned with organizing a family contract. Nevertheless, they must not be exaggerated even though various approaches are available for each specific case. If we are talking about Moscow Oblast on the whole, then it can be said that family contracts are not being employed extensively here. And the farm at the Vereyskiy Sovkhoz is essentially the first swallow which perhaps does not make the "Spring" in the Moscow area. Doubt in this regard arose during a discussion with a department head at the Moscow Oblast agroprom Viktor Vasilyevich Filimonov.

In his opinion, the oblast has a sufficiently high level of concentration and specialization in agricultural production. Intra-organizational accounting and the collective contract have been introduced into operations at a majority of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes. But the use of a family contract is fully possible at some populated points where a sharp reduction has taken place in the available labor resources. Only the construction of family reinforced concrete farms (similar to that found at the Vereyskiy Sovkhoz) is hardly justified. An agronomist confirms the reasoning of the director: existing available buildings should be utilized, capital repairs should be carried out on them and concern should be shown for improving the daily living conditions of those families which have consented to operate under contractual conditions.

Thus, in actual practice, the organization of a family contract can be carried out using various methods. Which one of these is most successful and effective? Here it is impossible to proceed in the absence of an economic computation. It is better to take seven measurements before cutting off once.

Thus there are various approaches. However, the basis for a family contract and its goals must be the same. These goals include: the retention of personnel in the rural areas, the introduction into operations of cost accounting principles and growth in the production of goods with minimal expenditures. This is what must not be forgotten.

Various Regions

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 6 Jul 86 p 2

/Article by M. Zarayev, Dagestan ASSR: "A Family Under Contract"/

/Text/ Towards the end of the hot summer day, the streets of the Dagestan village of Novyy Shtul came to life. Families were returning from nearby vineyards and the people were noisily entering their paved shady yards and spacious homes made out of cut stone.

The name Novyy Shtul cannot be found in the books of the selsoviet /village soviet/ or the documents of the Derbentskiy Rayon Executive Committee. But the

residents persistently refer to their settlement in this manner. All of them are migrants from the mountain village of Shtul, which is located in Kurakhskiy Rayon and the memory of the area in which their ancestors lived is memorialized in this name.

"Resettlement from the mountains to this location, in the Pre-Caspian Lowlands, took place during the mid-1960's," stated the director of the Sovkhoz imani 60-Letiya SSSR A.A. Alimov, "At the time, the decision seemed to be the only correct one and yet at the present time one can only think of how much arable land lies fallow up above there, wonderful pasture land!"

The fate of mountain villages is disturbing not only to the residents of Dagestan. Such settlements, with their small rocky fields spread out over steep slopes, their narrow paths and small meadows, are becoming uninhabited in other regions of the country. The small farms are being closed down and poor arable land is being abandoned. What can be done? Should entire villages be resettled in the valleys? Almost in unison with the thoughts of the director of Dagestan sovkhoz was a story told by the chief of the main administration of Gosagroprom for Georgia S.S. Rukhadze during the All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference entitled "Methods for Raising the Labor Potential of a Rural Family," which was held in Makhachkala.

In 1983, by way of an experiment, a decision was made at two sovkhozes in the mountainous Mestiyiskiy Rayon of Georgia to turn over cattle to families residing on the territory of farms, with each farmyard being allocated three hundredths of a hectare of arable land and one to five hundredths of a hectare of haying land. The relationships between a farm and families were controlled by family contractual agreements. Three years of work under the new system produced an increase in meat and milk sales and a reduction in cattle losses and culling out. The weight of the young bulls delivered increased from 230-250 to 300-320 kilograms. The sovkhoz and family income increased.

Let us return to the settlement of Novyy Shtul. Perhaps, if the same path had been followed at one time in Kurakhskiy Rayon as was followed by the sovkhozes in Mestiyiskiy Rayon, the peasants would not have settled in the Pre-Caspian Lowlands. However, here, in the environs of Derbent, the former mountain people are now working on the basis of a family contract. Four hundred and five hectares of vineyards -- 70 percent of the fruit-bearing plantations -- are divided among family collectives.

There is the team of the Ismailovyy brothers. Both have large families. The older brother, 50-year old Sayfutdin, in whose home we are sitting, has six children. In this team -- the brothers with their wives and the daughter-in-law of Sayfutdin furnish assistance to other relatives. The Ismailovyy's have undertaken responsibility for 10 hectares of sovkhoz vineyard. A planned harvest level of 85 quintals of grapes per hectare has been established for the team -- an average indicator for the rayon. For surpassing this level, a higher payment will be issued. And the level can be exceeded to a considerable degree. Last year, the team obtained 122 quintals per hectare and the year before -- 180 quintals. Last year, each member of the family collective, in addition to an advance of 950 rubles, received 1,000 additional rubles.

This is the tenth year now that a family contract has been employed at the Sovkhoz imeni 60-Letiya SSSR. Overall, as mentioned during a conference by the secretary of the Dagestan Oblast Party Committee Z.F. Pulatov, this method is being employed by 4,000 people in the autonomous republic and they have been assigned 6,500 hectares of arable land.

"The intent of family forms for labor organization," stated the head of a sector at the Institute of Economics for the international socialist system and Doctor of Economic Sciences G.I. Shmelev, "is to restore the broken link between man and the land. Indeed, for an extended period of time, in examining the relationship between the personality of a collective and society, we buried in oblivion the economic function of the family. Yes and not only the economic function. Meanwhile, tens of millions of rural families are maintaining private plots and training their children how to work and how to show respect for the land."

Restoration of the economy of mountain villages -- is only one area in which use can be made of the family contract. In the Russian Federation there are more than 9,000 dairy farms with up to 100 cows on tethered maintenance. Quite often they are located in small villages at some distance from a farm's center. To close them down by concentrating the cattle at the central farmstead serves only to accelerate the disappearance of such settlements. It would seem that in this instance a family contract is not only of economic but also of social importance.

However, this form of labor organization is by no means capable of eliminating all problems, nor is it a means for filling all gaps in production. The desired results are not always being obtained: land is made available for a contract, the planned yield is defined and also the amount of payment and the issuing of payments in kind and the products are accepted. Even in farming, the situation is not this simple. The director of a Dagestan sovkhoz, A.A. Alimov, indicated how difficult it is to observe contractual discipline when assigning machine operators to a family team. And there are even more difficulties in livestock husbandry. A kolkhoz undertakes to supply a family with feed and it does not meet its obligation -- a conflict thus arises.

The work volume must be presented in a clear manner. At the Vereyskiy Sovkhoz in Naro-Fominskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast, according to the head of a sector at VNIIESKh [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics] V.P. Vershinin, a farm was assigned to a family consisting of two individuals. No equipment was available. The people worked for a year and then departed. The scientist believes that neglected farms should not be included in a contract, with reliance being placed only upon the enthusiasm of the people and their affection for their native village. A small livestock husbandry facility should be built or mechanized and normal living conditions should be created for the family working there, with emphasis being placed upon young married couples. Indeed, such families are still seeking livelihoods in the North. Why can they not be attracted to small villages where they can develop an affection for the areas involved?

Use of the family contract in livestock husbandry has undergone considerable development in Estonia. Here there are 90 family undertakings on 46 farms.

The first was created 5 years ago in Tartuskiy Rayon at the Luunyaskiy Sovkhoz. There are now five of them there. Four are used for the fattening of cattle and one -- for dairy purposes. All are located at the outskirts of land utilization in repaired facilities and with housing nearby. The families are provided with livestock and small old tractors, a planned production level is established and incentive bonuses are paid out for above-plan output. The operational indicators of the family farms immediately exceeded the average sovkhoz indicators: 800 gram weight increases (more than 200 grams greater than the sovkhoz figure), approximately 5,000 kilograms -- annual milk yield (and on the farm -- just somewhat more than 4,000). Feed consumption and production costs were lower than the average sovkhoz figures. Senior scientific worker at the Institute of Economics of the Estonian Academy of Sciences I.Kh. Rayg emphasized that these indicators were the result of efficient observance of the contractual obligations by both sides.

Unfortunately, this is by no means the case in all areas. In the nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR, the most widespread form of a family contract is that of raising livestock which belong to a kolkhoz or sovkhoz. The number of contracts is increasing and yet the operational efficiency is often low. The families are returning low-weight animals to a kolkhoz or sovkhoz and sociological studies indicate that the farms are not satisfied with the contractual arrangements. The reasons for the dissatisfaction -- feed shortages, a formal approach to the work on the part of farm leaders and coercion when drawing up contracts. A senior scientific worker attached to the Scientific Research Institute of Economics and Organization of Agricultural Production in the Nonchernozem Zone of the RSFSR M.R. Fedorova has stated that some farm leaders are transforming assistance for a family into a "good deed," which can be carried out depending upon whether or not the family agrees with its plan for the sale of milk or livestock.

At the same time, the results are readily apparent in those areas where success was achieved in combining the economic interests of a rural family and social production. Indeed, a domestic contract at the Put K Rassvet Kolkhoz in Kromskiy Rayon in Orel Oblast is producing an average daily weight increase during the fattening of hogs of 600-700 grams, with a 100 percent preservation of the animals. The contract at this farm is not simply a meaningless piece of paper filled out in a careless manner for the sake of a report. A family which undertakes to fatten a kolkhoz young pig receives 4 quintals of grain forage and 3 quintals of fodder beets. Using waste food scraps and potatoes from its own garden, it returns to the kolkhoz an animal weighing from 100 to 130 kilograms within 7-8 months.

Failures in the use of family contracts as a rule occur through no fault of the families involved. The people are prepared to work at maximum capability, to raise livestock and to tend the kolkhoz fields. They only ask that they be given the feed, fertilizer and seed needed.

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CSO: 1824/449

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

UDC 631.158:658.387

COLLECTIVE CONTRACT, WAGE INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS VIEWED

Moscow EKONOMIKA SELSKOGO KHOZYAYSTVA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 3-10

[Article: "Collective Contract and New Measures of Material Incentives for Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz Workers"]

[Text] Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Until the Year 2000 set big tasks for agriculture—attaining a stable growth of agricultural production and reliably providing the country with food products and agricultural raw materials. Goals for the production of all basic agricultural products were set.

Experience shows that in the solution of these problems an important role belongs to advanced forms of labor organization and wages, primarily to the collective contract. A general introduction, improvement, and intensification of contract relations is one of the major factors, which will contribute to an activation of the human factor, whose importance in an increase in production efficiency was discussed at the 27th CPSU Congress.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Further Improvement in the Economic Mechanism of Management in the Country's Agro-Industrial Complex" notes that the collective contract and cost accounting are the most important factors in an increase in production efficiency. USSR Gosagroprom and its local bodies must organize in the shortest period the transfer of all production subdivisions of agricultural, processing, and other enterprises to the conditions of the collective contract and cost accounting.

To implement party and government decisions, economic and organizational work will have to be expanded in an all-around manner. At the same time, it is important to lean on the experience attained during preceding years.

Work on the introduction of the collective contract was carried out widely in all rayons, oblasts (krays), and republics in 1983-1985 and now this form of labor organization and wages is predominant. In 1985 more than 65 percent of the arable land of kolkhozes and sovkhozes was attached to contract collectives. Contract brigades and links tilled the overwhelming majority of areas of basic agricultural crops determining production results on farms. Thus, they cultivated two-thirds of the grain and fodder crops, three-fourths of the potatoes and vegetables, almost all sugar beet crops, two-thirds of the

fiber flax, and on many farms almost all labor intensive crops. The area of irrigated land attached to contract brigades and links expanded. In 1985 they tilled 73.3 percent of the irrigated land of kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

The introduction of the collective contract in animal husbandry was accelerated considerably. In 1985 contract collectives of kolkhozes and sovkhozes serviced 33.6 percent of the cattle, 33 percent of the cows, 42.4 percent of the hogs, 71.6 percent of the sheep, and 55.9 percent of the poultry. By comparison, in 1983 only 5.7 percent of the cow stock, 8 percent of the hogs, and 28 percent of the sheep were attached to such collectives.

It is important to note that in many of the country's regions there are now quite a few rayons, where all kolkhozes and sovkhozes operate on the basis of collective contract principles. Such rayons exist in Belgorod, Orel, and other RSFSR oblasts, in the Ukraine, and in Belorussia.

Practical experience shows that, all things being equal, contract labor collectives obtain more output, as compared with other subdivisions, and their labor productivity is higher and production costs are lower. For example, the yield of grain crops in kolkhoz and sovkhoz brigades and links operating by the collective contract method was 15.6 percent higher than in ordinary subdivisions and labor expenditures per quintal of grain crops, sugar beets, cotton, and potatoes were 8 to 10 percent lower. Output per head of fattening cattle was 22 percent higher, in dairy husbandry, 4 percent, in hog breeding, 14 percent, and in sheep breeding, 12 percent.

Virtually all rayons now have farms, where basic contract requirements, which have been profoundly and clearly formulated in M. S. Gorbachev's speech at the all-Union conference in Belgorod, are being fulfilled.

At the same time, an analysis and generalization of the work of contract subdivisions shows that in the work of these collectives there are serious shortcomings, which do not make it possible to fully utilize the potentials of this advanced form of labor organization. This was discussed at zonal conferences of secretaries of central committees of communist parties of the Union republics and rayon and oblast party committees and of managers of agro-industrial committees of the Union and autonomous republics and the country's krays and oblasts held in Krasnoyarsk, Rostov-on-Don, Alma-Ata, and Lvov in January-February of the current year.

Favorable objective prerequisites for the accomplishment of the task concerning a more extensive dissemination of the collective contract set by the party have been formed in agriculture and other APK sectors. For the time being, however, it is being introduced not as required under present conditions. For example, in Vinnitsa Oblast about 80 percent of the sugar beet crops are attached to contract subdivisions, but in 1985 the harvest of sugar beets decreased by 54 quintals per hectare, as compared with 1984, and by 34 quintals per hectare, as compared with the 10th Five-Year Plan.

Similar examples can also be cited for a number of the country's other zones. Thus, on farms in the Tajik SSR the cotton harvest in contract subdivisions

totaled 28.6 quintals per hectare and in brigades and links not using the contract, 31.1 quintals per hectare.

Such a situation is due primarily to the fact that many farms have not carried out the necessary work on reorienting the psychology of machine operators and on "readjusting" organizational structures and economic relations on the basis of cost accounting.

In a number of places the approach to the introduction of the contract has been formal and an attempt has been made to squeeze new forms of labor organization and wages into frameworks of long established organizational forms not meeting present requirements.

On the Kolkhoz imeni Komintern in Kozeletskiy Rayon, Chernigov Oblast, a tractor brigade has been transferred to a contract, 40 tractors being attached to it. This brigade, as earlier, continues to service three production sections. Furthermore, the labor of machine operators, as before, is paid for according to individual piecework for the volume of work. In such a situation there can be no serious talk about a contract.

Every production section on this farm has a crop rotation and sufficient equipment and machine operating personnel, that is, there is every condition to establish true cost accounting contract collectives. Kolkhoz specialists themselves realize that on the basis of the tractor brigade it would be possible to establish three subdivisions, attaching a crop rotation to each one, and to assign part of the machine operators to work at sections. Collectives would be of optimum sizes and could efficiently apply contract and cost accounting principles. However, realizing this, managers and specialists postpone the solution of this problem and RAPO workers do not correct them.

The insufficiently high level of efficiency of the introduction of the collective contract and the small scale of its dissemination were also due to reasons of an economic order. The decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee significantly increased material incentives for contract work for machine operators and other mass trade personnel. However, farm managers, specialists, and employees did not directly receive material incentives for the introduction of the collective contract. The lack of such a dependence hampered the introduction of the collective contract, because workers, managers, and specialists were not under equal wage conditions.

Many farm managers and specialists openly and frankly said that under those conditions it was difficult for them to convince machine operators and to introduce contract relations.

In accordance with the above-mentioned decree wages for managers, specialists, and employees of sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises at rates (standards) based on sold (gross) output are now being introduced.

Rates for output will be established directly on a farm, as a rule, per 1,000 rubles' worth of sold (produced) output and will be collective for all managers and employees in the administration of a sovkhoz, or of a sector, a shop, a department, a farm, and a section.

For managers, specialists, and employees performing official duties throughout the sovkhoz rates are established on the basis of the average annual volume of sale of agricultural products attained during the preceding 5 years throughout the sovkhoz and of the annual amount of wages of these workers during a given year according to salaries. For workers responsible for the work of one sector (plant growing or animal husbandry) rates for products can be established for each sector separately.

For managers, specialists, and employees of departments, farms, sections, and shops rates are determined on the basis of the average annual volume of production of agricultural products attained during the preceding 5 years according to the corresponding annual amount of their wages for a given year based on salaries.

Prior to the settlement for output managers, specialists, and employees, including medium-level specialists forming part of contract collectives (brigades and links), are paid an advance at the rate of 80 percent of the established salaries included in the calculation of rates.

On sovkhozes, where products are received uniformly during the year, wages for managers, specialists, and employees for products according to established rates can be paid monthly. In this case an advance at the rate of 80 percent is not made.

The new procedure of wages for managers, specialists, and employees on sovkhozes places them under equal conditions in terms of material incentives with workers of contract subdivisions, which, undoubtedly, will change their attitude toward this advanced form of labor organization and wages and will positively affect an acceleration of the rates of its introduction and improvement.

It should be added to this that the new procedure of wages for output for managers and specialists in the administrative machinery of rayon agro-industrial associations and gosagroproms of autonomous republics and of agro-industrial committees of krays and oblasts will also operate in the direction of an increase in the interest and responsibility of bodies for the management of the agro-industrial complex for final production results.

The procedure of payment of bonuses to managers, specialists, and employees of sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises is also changing. Now, instead of incentives according to a large number of indicators, farm managers and specialists will receive bonuses for an increase in the sale of agricultural products, for production profitability, and for an increase in profitability. These are generalizing synthetic indicators, which characterize the efficiency of farm work.

Along with the intensification of material incentives measures of material responsibility are being introduced. They are also directed toward an increase in production efficiency and the attainment of high final results. In particular, it has been established that, if a farm underfulfills the plan for the sale of grain, milk, livestock, and poultry (at specialized enterprises, in addition, products of the basic sector) to the state, as well

as with an outstripping growth of wages, as compared with labor productivity, managers, specialists, and employees are fully or partially deprived of bonuses credited to them in accordance with the decision of RAPO and other superior organizations.

For the purpose of intensifying cost accounting and contract principles in the work of sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises, a new procedure of formation of the wage fund will be introduced as of 1987. Farms themselves will establish it according to standards per 100 rubles's worth of sold (gross) agricultural output, which will be stable for the five-year plan. At the same time, standards should ensure an outstripping growth of labor productivity, as compared with the growth of wages.

For products produced in excess of the level, according to which the standard will be established, per percent of increase in the sale (production) of products the wage fund is determined according to a standard, on the average, corrected by a coefficient of 0.8.

It has been established that wage fund savings are assigned in equal shares to the material incentive fund and to the reserve fund of the farm and that overexpenditure is compensated from these funds and, if there is a shortage of them, through a reduction in bonuses credited to the farm collective.

In case of outstripping rates of growth of average wages, as compared with labor productivity, the appropriate part of the material incentive fund is reserved for its utilization during the following year for the stimulation of the further growth of labor productivity and an increase in production efficiency, or is assigned to the fund for social and cultural measures during the current year.

Not only a fundamentally new procedure of formation of the wage fund is established in such a manner, but also incentive measures and measures of material responsibility for the utilization of the wage fund are introduced for the first time in the practice of sovkhoz production. Essentially, this is a contract for the entire farm collective.

The new procedure of formation of the wage fund according to stable standards per 100 rubles's worth of gross output was first checked experimentally on 29 sovkhozes in Belgorod Oblast and on farms in Suzdalskiy Rayon, Vladimir Oblast, and in Yelgavskiy and Kraslavskiy rayons in the Latvian SSR for a number of years.

Experience showed that the directors of these farms began to approach the expenditure of wage funds more sensibly and responsibly. Whereas before the experiment the wage expenditure on farms increased constantly, now it decreased. For example, before the experiment the wage fund per 100 rubles' worth of gross output in Suzdalskiy Rayon totaled 42.9 rubles, during the period of work under new conditions (1984-1985) it decreased to 40.3 rubles, or by 7 percent. On farms in Belgorod Oblast these expenditures were reduced from 41.7 to 40.8 rubles, while output increased by more than 20 percent.

Owing to unfavorable weather conditions, in 1985 sovkhozes in Suzdalskiy Rayon obtained a smaller harvest of agricultural crops than expected, in connection with which there was a shortage of the wage fund determined according to standards per unit of output. The rayon's farms were forced to replenish this shortage from the reserve wage fund in the amount of 70,000 rubles formed as a result of the savings in 1984 and the decrease in bonuses from the material incentive fund in the amount of 217,000 rubles.

The popular phrase "contract and cost accounting are indivisible" has appeared on the pages of many journals and newspapers. However, on many farms cost accounting exists formally, on paper. According to reports, more than two-thirds of the farms apply cost accounting. In practice, however, this is not at all the case. The fact that incentives for workers for saving direct expenditures in the structure of additional payments and bonuses account for a negligibly small share—5 to 7 rubles per worker, on the average—serves as a convincing confirmation. Such a situation is due to many reasons, primarily, the insufficiently high level of economic and organizational work on many farms. However, nor should the material incentive procedure, which was in effect, be counted out. After all, up to 25 percent of the amount of obtained savings, as compared with the plan, in plant growing and up to 40 percent in animal husbandry was allocated for the payment of bonuses to workers for the saving of direct expenditures. On many farms this measure did not work, because often plans were assigned to production subdivisions without the proper substantiation and, moreover, the amounts of the bonuses themselves were not appreciable sufficiently.

Up to 70 percent of the obtained savings will now be assigned for the payment of bonuses to collectives of subdivisions of sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises for saving expenditures envisaged in an assignment and, if the established expenditures are exceeded, they will be refunded from the funds intended for wages and for the payment of bonuses to collectives.

At present wages based on gross income should be more extensively applied in the practice of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. With such wages the amount of material incentives depends not only on the quantity and quality of produced products, but also, which is very important, on the expenditures on their production. Therefore, wages for collectives of brigades and links based on gross income represent the most reliable anti-expenditure mechanism. In essence, they are cost accounting, directing the work of collectives toward the attainment of high final results. A number of kolkhozes in Dnepropetrovsk, Kurgan, and Crimean oblasts and in Stavropol and Krasnodar krays apply them. This experience must be carefully studied and measures for its more extensive dissemination should be adopted.

USSR Gosagroprom jointly with research institutes prepared recommendations on the procedure of formation of the wage fund on the basis of standards of deductions from gross income.

One of the varieties of the contract—the family contract—has been applied in a number of the country's regions in the last few years. Experience shows that this form of labor organization and wages proves worthwhile in the

cultivation of labor intensive crops at a low level of their mechanization and in livestock servicing on small animal husbandry farms.

Where the approach to this matter is thoughtful, the family contract organically flows into public production and contributes to an increase in its efficiency. The experience of farms in Georgia, the Baltic region, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, and some other regions attests to this.

For example, on the Krinichanskiy Sovkhoz in Donetsk Oblast the family and personal contract have been widely applied in vegetable growing since 1981. More than 400 people work on the basis of a contract. Many of them are pensioners and housewives in cities adjacent to the sovkhoz—Makeyevka and Gorlovka. They engage in vegetable growing during their free time. They perform manual operations on an area of 800 hectares. The vegetable harvest on the sovkhoz was 283 quintals per hectare in 1985 and 193 quintals per hectare in 1981. The annual profit from the sale of vegetables increased up to 415,000 rubles.

It was recommended that sovkhozes and kolkhozes more widely apply the family and personal contract in plant growing and animal husbandry as one of the forms of the cost accounting contract. At the same time, wages for these workers are paid in the same manner as those for collectives of contract brigades and links.

For the purpose of increasing material incentives for contract collectives, as well as for workers employed on the basis of the family and personal contract, farm managers have been granted the right to give them up to 25 percent of the products obtained in excess of the volume determined according to an agreement in the form of payment in kind. At workers' wish, instead of payment in kind, its value at retail prices can be given.

The application of collective wages for brigade and link workers depending on final results—the quantity and quality of output—and the distribution of collective earnings among subdivision members depending on the personal contribution of each of them to common work results are some of the most important principles and conditions of contract work. Of all the presently existing wage systems the job-contract-plus-bonus system corresponds to this principle to the greatest extent.

Many justified critical remarks about the practice of application of the job-contract-plus-bonus system have been expressed on the pages of newspapers and journals. In fact, it was based on planned indicators and, where farms established unrealistic plans for the field yield and livestock productivity, this system slightly interested workers, managers, and specialists in an increase in output.

The situation has changed in the last few years. A number of changes and supplements aimed at simplifying it and increasing its efficiency have been introduced into the job-contract-plus-bonus system.

In every zone in our country there are many farms, whose field yield, livestock productivity, and production efficiency are much higher than those

of their surrounding kolkhozes and sovkhozes. All these advanced farms apply the job-contract-plus-bonus system. Therefore, taking into account the experience of advanced farms into account, as well as the fact that many provisions aimed at improving and simplifying the wage system have been introduced into it, it can be stated that at present, with a creative application taking specific farm conditions into account, it ensures sufficient interest on the part of workers and kolkhoz members in final production results and the dependence of their earnings on the amount of the harvest of agricultural crops, productivity of animals, and production efficiency. The task of farm managers and specialists is to apply in practice the provisions inherent in the job-contract-plus-bonus system in a skillful and economically competent manner and with a knowledge of the situation and specific conditions of brigades and links.

Advance payments to members of contract collectives prior to settlements for output are some of the most important problems in wage organization in contract collectives. It can be stated with confidence that, without solving this problem correctly, it is impossible to ensure the functioning of the contract link or brigade.

Experience shows that true contract relations and concern for the harvest are manifested only where an end has been put to individual piecework and where collective wages based on final results with advance payments during the year prior to final results for output have been introduced in practice.

Such a procedure of advance payments corresponds to the greatest extent to the essence of contract relations, because in this case the common result of joint activity--the harvest of agricultural crops and the quantity and quality of output--is truly the only source of remuneration for the labor of every link member.

However, a time advance cannot and should not be a remuneration for appearance at work. It should be established with due regard for individual qualities of workers so that it may reflect the labor invested by every worker in the common results of work of a brigade or a link. It should contribute to the observance of technological discipline and place a barrier against unconscientious workers in the chase after hectares to the detriment of the quality of work and, consequently, of the growth of the harvest.

Many farm managers and specialists fail to realize this chief thing. They believe that in the case of time advances it is impossible to record the labor productivity of machine operators and erroneously assume that such a recording is possible only when the individual piece-rate system is applied. In reality this is not so. On many farms the productivity of machine operators is recorded by means of the labor participation coefficient and other indicators.

As noted more than once, collective piece-rate wages according to a single order should be considered a form of advance in transition to an improved one--the time form. At the same time, it is important to note that wages according to a single order should be credited for the volume of performed work not personally to every machine operator or another worker, but to the entire collective of workers for the entire volume of work performed by them

during a specific period. These collective earnings should be distributed among machine operators and other workers in accordance with the procedure established by members of the contract collective themselves. Only under such conditions can such a procedure of advance payments be considered acceptable to brigades and links working on the basis of a contract.

Experience shows that the introduction of collective wages for output with advance payments during the year is by no means a simple matter. Here the preparation of orders and agreements concerning the transfer to a contract will not do and general appeals and arguments will not help.

The introduction of new wage principles requires painstaking, persistent, and, if one may say so, daily and hourly organizational and explanatory work aimed at changing workers' psychology and at a thoughtful and convincing explanation of the fact that wages for output are most acceptable both to members of contract collectives and to the farm as a whole and that they combine personal and public interests.

During many years kolkhozes and sovkhozes, prior to the final settlement for output, have applied individual piece-rate wages for the volume of performed work. Under the piece-rate system personal interest is closer, more understandable, and clearer: If one does more (although not necessarily better), one will (necessarily) receive more. Earnings are known every day, because it is easy and simple to record the number of hectares plowed or sown by every machine operator. Knowing the earnings, the piece-rate worker is satisfied with his labor every day, but this pushes his thought and reflection about the future harvest into the background.

In farming it is easy and simple to evaluate the quantitative results of work of an individual machine operator, but it is almost impossible for the forces of the agronomic apparatus to evaluate with a sufficient degree of accuracy the quality of performance of all types of work by every worker on vast areas.

Scientific research institutes have worked out rules of performance of mechanized work, standard operational technologies of performance of mechanized work, and standard operational technologies of cultivation of agricultural crops. These documents determine according to what indicators and how the quality of performance of mechanized work should be controlled. For example, to determine the quality of fall and fallow plowing, it is necessary to control the deviation from the specified cultivation depth, the availability and size of areas with uncovered vegetation, the ridging of furrows, and the height of crown ridges and open furrows. The control method is also set forth. Thus, it is necessary to measure the depth of arable land cultivation in 20 places along the field's diagonal line and through intervals of 100 to 150 meters, to determine the average cultivation depth, and to compare it with the prescribed depth. According to the estimates of the laboratory of labor standards of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Economics of Agriculture, an agronomist has to spend 65 minutes only on the control of the depth of cultivation by one machine operator per shift and 238 minutes, on all the four indicators controlled by him during plowing. The machine operator's shift lasts 420 minutes.

A total of 246 minutes have to be spent on controlling the quality of herbicide application, 232 minutes, the quality of potato planting, and so forth. With such requirements an agronomist can control the quality of work of only two machine operators per day. Hence it is clear that it is almost impossible to exercise continuous external control of the quality of work.

Spot evaluations of the quality of performance of individual types of work on small areas do not eliminate the striving on the part of some machine operators for an increase in output at the expense of quality. Demands for an improvement in the quality of work are perceived by machine operators as a factor hampering an increase in daily output under the piece-rate system. Nor can the padding of the volumes of work be ruled out in some cases.

While interesting machine operators in the growth of individual output, in their essence piece-rate wages do not and cannot stimulate the quality of performed work. Yet the yield of agricultural crops directly depends on the high quality of performance of all operations connected with the cultivation and harvesting of agricultural crops.

Of course, the common earnings of kolkhoz members and sovkhоз workers depend on the work results of farms. However, this dependence is deeply hidden in the mechanism of management, material incentives, and economic mutual relations of farms with the state.

Under the collective contract it is much more complicated for workers and kolkhoz members to understand and assimilate the wage system. They have to believe in it and to firmly carry this belief through from the beginning of field work until harvesting, because the final earnings of members of contract brigades and links will become known only after the harvest is in bins, that is, after the attainment of certain socially useful results of labor.

This requires daily explanatory work aimed at reorienting people's psychology. Unfortunately, many farm managers and specialists do not realize the importance of this work for a successful functioning of collectives of contract brigades and links. Therefore, the efficiency of work of contract collectives inherent in this advanced form of labor organization and wages does not exist in a number of places.

Managers and specialists of agricultural bodies and farms now must analyze the results of work of contract subdivisions, generalize advanced experience, and uncover and correct existing shortcomings. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Further Improvement in the Management of the Agro-Industrial Complex" stresses that a broad application of economic methods of management of agriculture and cost accounting relations and the introduction of advanced forms of labor organization and wages are the most important directions in work connected with the acceleration of scientific and technical progress in agro-industrial production.

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CSO: 1824/436

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

PAPER VIEWS VOLGOGLA OBLAST EXPERIMENT

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Aug 86 p 10

[Article by Aleksandr Nikitin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent in the nonchernozem area: "Don't Be Afraid, Manager"]

[Text] An experiment has been going on in the agriculture of the Vologda area since 1 January 1986. The oblast and kray receive a firm 5-year state order for the sale of products, which is unchangeable throughout the years. Everything that is above it, they keep for themselves.

Farms themselves plan the production and delivery of all types of products (not below the level of the last five-year plan) and can sell some of them at the market. They also plan the wage fund independently, getting away from its real expenditure per 100 rubles' worth of products during the 2 preceding years. RAPO has the right to regulate funds, taking into consideration the conditions under which a specific farm works and the labor productivity attained by it. The earnings of managers and specialists—from the sovkhoz to the oblast agro-industrial committee—are formed at rates per 1,000 rubles' worth of products. During the year there is an advance in terms of 80 to 90 percent of the salary and a settlement according to final results. Contract collectives—both in the field and on the farm—can receive free of charge part of the products produced by them in excess of the assignment, or all the products. The rights of farms in planning and construction have been expanded.

Many of these conditions have become part of the new economic mechanism, which is being introduced into the country's agroprom as of 1 January 1987. The people of Vologda Oblast have been working according to the new method for half a year.

Have there been changes for the better during these months? In meat production, yes, but in the output of milk the oblast hardly sustains last year's level. The summer of 1985 was wet and the quality of feed, low—this is the result. Previously, such an excuse was simply a godsend for managers. Now, when the products "in excess of the order" are left to the oblast, it somehow loses its meaning. An objective reason, even the most elaborate, cannot be used as an excuse. Therefore, hay sheds with ventilators are being built energetically everywhere. All hay is to be hidden once and for all under a roof in the next 2 years. It seems that it is still early to judge about the changes. In the Vologda area everyone is saying: "Chickens are counted in the fall." They are counted in the fall, but are raised now!

Let us begin with the experimental conditions themselves. I asked dozens of people in four rayons, with whom I was talking, the following question: "Well, how have your hands been untied? Do you have more independence?" "Certainly, we ourselves decide with what to occupy sown areas and how much livestock to keep."

Grain and potato areas are reduced most of all and more grass is sown. This is an animal husbandry and meat and dairy oblast. The herd has been "reshuffled" thoroughly. On the Dmitriyevskiy Sovkhoz in Cherepovetskiy Rayon almost one-fourth of the herd—all the crippled cows—has been dispatched for meat. Milk production has jumped 35 percent annually! How many parasitical cows are kept in the country by such weak farms as Dmitriyevskiy! What hidden potentials we have! In this case the cows have not merely been culled, but replaced with productive ones. However, it is also possible to simply reduce the stock and to better feed the remaining herd—milk will be added as a result of this alone. The sacred figure of the "planned stock" and the "assignment according to tails" hamper this. Under the experiment this bugaboo has lost its strength.

However, a malicious question was constantly on the tip of my tongue: In fact, what does the experiment have to do with this? Farms were permitted to plan crops and stock for themselves a very long time ago—in March 1953—and this right was confirmed more than once. The fact that it was not observed (in other oblasts it is not observed even now) is another matter. Why has the Vologda area become a pleasant exception under the new conditions? People shrug their shoulders:

"Probably, under the experiment it is inconvenient to order farms about. The spirit and mood in the oblast have changed."

"Well, all right, and what about the experiment itself? What rights did it give?"

"Feed plans are not imposed on us. We choose crops ourselves."

"This is a serious right! However, the experiment states more: You yourselves plan the production and delivery of all products."

"There is a reservation: not below the level of the last five-year plan. If not for this reservation, we would give up potatoes. We have only 50

hectares, but we have trouble with them. There is not enough manpower, chiefs harvest them, and yields are low. Nor would we sell grain to the state. This is nonsense: We deliver 500 tons and we receive four times as much from state stocks. Why should they be dragged back and forth? Please understand: We ourselves are not interested in reducing the total volume of output. This will hit us in our pocketbooks. We would replace grain and potatoes with milk and meat."

In the rayon and oblast such complaints by farms are met with extreme hostility. "Look, they have become greedy! If you give them freedom, they will stir up such confusion and will leave cities without potatoes!"

Let us ponder: What is the goal of the experiment? To preserve and increase everything in succession? Or to uncover camouflaged contradictions so that the awl can crawl out of the bag and underwater stones, up against which we will stumble all the same, are exposed? Potatoes can be harvested on a few farms, which can be equipped with machinery, warehouses, and so forth. According to the experimental conditions the oblast agroprom has a "boiler of prices." "Fat" can be removed from some other product and transferred to potatoes. A great deal is possible if one does not count on the force of the order, but uses economic methods broadly.

"Not below the level of the last five-year plan..." Always and everywhere? I saw a farm, which simply must temporarily retreat and move up the rear. The Kommunist Sovkhoz in Cherepovetskiy Rayon is a specialized giant: It has 54,000 hogs. It has exceeded its planned capacity by 20 percent! Others have lagged behind for 10 years. According to the degree of mastering Kommanist is the second in Russia. "We have reached the climax"--this is how director G. A. Pychev expressed himself. "The pipelines have rotted through, repairs and reconstruction are needed, but we receive scanty materials and it is not possible to close the shops: The plan presses: above the level of the last five-year plan. We pay people 80 percent of the salary and are not confident that we will reach 100 percent at the end of the year. Why does the experiment punish us? Because we work better than others?"

In general, this is a rare situation. Other farms, even the most advanced, still have growth potentials--some more, some less. However, does the experiment not place too big a stress on growth above the last level? Everything depends on it: plans, the wage fund, and rates for management and for contract workers. It is also necessary to consider who had what level. We really do not know which farm in our oblast is advanced, which is average, and which is lagging. We blindly praise and lash out at people, giving them banners and reprimands. Of course, everyone suspects that there is something wrong with the evaluations. There is an appalling diversity of output and profit per 100 hectares of land. Those whose yield is bigger are offended: "We carry the burden for us and for the weaklings." Often they are right. The weaklings counterattack: "Give me what the bigwigs have, then make demands on us."

And so I saw a report in Vologda, about which I have dreamt for a long time. Not the "prodding report," which made people sow on frozen ground, or mow undergrown grass. Not the one that the chairman I know considers one of his

three main misfortunes: "report, vodka, and weather." But a report on how the rayon and the farm utilize their capabilities and their "resource potential." Land, capital, manpower, and so forth--how much output do they give? A group of economists headed by A. G. Novikova has been performing this work by means of a computer for a long time. The figures are beginning to penetrate into "agrarian masses." An impression as from an exploded bomb! L. N. Vologdin, chairman of the oblast agroprom, once said at a conference that central rayons--Vologodskiy and Cherepovetskiy--in the utilization of resources work worse than some eastern rayons--recognized oblast "lagging spots." The audience exclaimed "ah!"

Such a report should be published in the oblast KRASNYY SEVER newspaper! And a similar one--throughout oblasts and republics--in the central press. Is the country not interested in knowing who manages more diligently--the Vologda or Stavropol area? Kuban or Kareliya?

The people of Vologda area still poorly utilize resource potentials in planning: There has been a delay in their calculation. In some other oblasts even the quality of land has not been inspected properly. How do they intend to work as of 1987 according to the new method with "standard planning," about which so much was said at the party congress?

Before my trip throughout the oblast I asked A. I. Valyuzhenich, head of the agricultural department of the oblast party committee, what disturbed him in the experiment.

"Pondering! Rights were given, but some sat and pondered: What should be done with them? Talk with those that 'ponder'!"

I liked this trustful-critical recommendation very much. Previously, it would have been rushed to Rodina, to twice Hero M. G. Lobytov... V. D. Bukhonin, first secretary of the Sheksninskiy Rayon Committee, kept up this trustful conversation. Once he was the chairman of "Sheksna", then he went as "first" [secretary] to a remote rayon, and now he has returned home. As soon as I saw him, I immediately remembered the following ditty:

Do not brag about grain, Bukhonin
Those who brag often break,
We will beat "Sheksna" all the same,
Oh, let us not chatter any more

This is from the book "Solenaya nauka" [Salt Science] by D. M. Kuzovlev. In this book this ditty is recited by the people of Kirovskiy Rayon, rivals of "Sheksna." I also remembered Dmitriy Mikhaylovich himself--small, agile, with his immature boyish forelock. What a fate! A Moscow journalist, voluntary kolkhoz chairman, who improved the kolkhoz, then first secretary of the rayon committee. Together with a group of enthusiasts he decided to make the rayon the first experimental rayon in Russia with RAPO, like Abashskiy [Rayon] in Georgia. Bureaucratic ways turned out to be more durable in Russia and the matter was bogged down. Kuzovlev died of a heart attack, not reaching the age of 60. People say that the memory of the incomplete Sheksna search has contributed to the fact that the Vologda area has been made "experimental."

Bukhonin now looks anew at his native rayon. He sat behind the steering wheel and we drove with him throughout farms. For the first time I felt the sharp, unusual taste of the "experimental" life there--the taste of truth and openness. The three of us--the secretary, the chairman, and the reporter--sat down. How did the conversation usually proceed previously? We with the secretary were supposed to press the "head" with our bellies: Why didn't you do this or that? Why do you lag behind in the report? Why did you reduce the output of milk? The chairman was supposed to whine and justify himself. Now we remember: He is a person extremely interested in this milk. Administrative pressure is inappropriate here: A fiery horse is not lashed with a whip. One can give advise, but accurately--he knows his farm better. And the chairman remembers: I am the manager, I am the one to decide, I am a sovereign person. Therefore, he will not say "yes". If he does not agree, he will object, as was the case on the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin. There chairman V. D. Sovetov resolutely took my side in the dispute with Bukhonin about city residents. "For me a person spending the summer in the country is a helper, not a hindrance. He mows hay and makes a contract for beets." In my opinion, Bukhonin liked this. He then said that at a conference a certain instructor at the rayon committee called Sovetov, because of his "excessive" independence, an "unripe watermelon." When the instructor was removed, he was also reminded of this "watermelon."

As an "Example", the managers swore at each other in front of us. The deputy, who replaced the chairman, revealed that according to reports there were lots of feed units, but there was nothing to feed with and hay was bad. The carelessness of cost accounting relations between the contract collectives of the field and the farm was brought out into the open. It was uncovered without fear that it would get into the report of the rayon committee.

Golden grains of economic initiative and of unexpected imagination constantly flashed in conversations. Where was "pondering"? Right there on these farms.

On the Prozhektor Sovkhoz in Vologodskiy Rayon I talked with milkmaids G. A. Somova, G. I. Belova, and A. A. Komissarova. All three were fierce patriots of their flourishing farm. But then I asked: "Girls, what did especially interest you personally in the experiment?" "Payment in kind. We will receive butter free of charge--wonderful!" "Have you already received it?" "Not yet."

Later I had this conversation on every farm and I noted that for ordinary workers this was precisely the very gist of the experiment. There is enough money--people are now interested in the product itself. We dreamt about how a kolkhoz or RAPO would start its own creamery, or even a sausage shop, inviting a good expert, a German or a Transcarpathian Hungarian, and then the calf attendant would treat her guests to a real salami. The oblast authorities lashed out tirelessly: Why is payment in kind not given anywhere? Probably, Vologda has decided to sweep everything under its rug as the capital's departments did earlier? However, in no way did I expect the answer given to me by A. I. Valyuzhenich:

"And who prohibits this? Experimental conditions are on hand, isn't it so? They were signed by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers! At a

conference in winter we talked about all this--about butter and sausage. Should a special permit be sent to every sovkhoz? Enough, what the hell, they are afraid of their own shadows!"

True, there is also another aspect of this matter. The oblast is supposed to share products "in excess of the order" among itself, the rayon, and the farm. Three figures are needed. For almost half a year L. N. Vologdin and agroprom's economists have been pondering over them as the operatic Hermann ponders over the three cards.

The manager is still afraid! He is afraid at all levels. Bureaucratism engaged in "specialization" for so many years! It made unnecessary fuss. It placed mines between the worker and his products, among agroprom partners, and between the worker and the manager. The field was cleared of mines, but out of habit people are afraid to lift even a foot... It should also be taken into consideration that everyone around the experiment lives in the old way. Agroprom is like Robinson on an island.

V. A. Ardabyev, secretary of the rayon committee, said the following about V. I. Skvortsov, director of the Cherepovets Dmitriyevskiy Sovkhoz: "He is a clever guy. He has led the collective and is raising the farm to its feet." I traveled throughout fields with him. I saw how calmly and respectfully he talked to workers and how tractor operators, flattered, beamed when he handed them the challenge pennant. However, he also saw another thing: This is not a work day in sowing, but torture, quagmire! If a tractor operator goes to the rayon to pull his tooth, there is no one to replace him—the entire link stands still. If a tractor breaks down, there are no spare parts. Equipment breaks down continuously. On Dmitriyevskiy land resembles the moon: There are pools of stones on every meter. There is one stone removing machine. A tractor operator is taken away for sowing and there is no one to replace him. G. I. Balandin, a milk specialist, came from the oblast. He looked how cows were milked. They were milked in an absolutely incompetent manner. The sovkhoz loses 20 to 25 percent of the milk as a result of this alone. The elderly milkmaids are experienced. He read them a lecture and they were delighted: "No one explained this to us in such a way." In the evening he again went to the section: They milked like they used to! "What is this?!" Skvortsov vowed that he would solve this problem in a few weeks.

Personnel! Their quantity and quality! Here is a problem hanging over the Vologda rural area as a nightmare. It is not provided with workers even for one shift. Where else, on what city plant, even the weakest, can such a situation be encountered?

The main valor of the chairman or director is not to fulfill the plan, but to retain personnel—to build, to fight through, and to get what is necessary to retain people or to replace them with equipment.

Nevertheless, the result is strange: The treasury now literally showers rural areas with money—loans, capital investments, and wholesale price increases. However, a good half of this money is empty, without material provision. What is this golden rain for? Rural residents talk about the present allocation system with outright hatred: "If it is not replaced with

wholesale trade in the very near future, nothing will happen even with RAPO, even with the experiment." No one believes in the fatal inevitability of the "shortage" of any equipment and any materials. This shortage is artificial.

Here is the Nalazskoye Sovkhoz. It has made remarkable advances in feed production. It harvests three grass crops in a summer, 50 quintals of feed units each time. In terms of grain this is 50 quintals per hectare! Director G. N. Pigosov says the following: "Do you know what is needed so that others may obtain three crops and we may obtain a fourth one? Good equipment! German Ye-280 combines instead of this Gomel KSK-100 lemon."

The Shukhobodskiy Sovkhoz. Director Yu. V. Kelsin is offended: "We have received powerful tractors. They can pull a whole train, but we have not received trailers for them. We harness elephants to a baby carriage."

There has been talk about a tractor float for several years, but the industry seems to be deaf. It produces and produces tractors, of which there are two per machine operator on many sovkhozes.

Building materials. Seemingly, there is a shortage. How to overcome it? Rural residents say unanimously: "We don't need additional payments for low profitability. Give this money for the development of brick and reinforced concrete plants and supply them with materials." Prigosov even offered part of his profit to a Cherepovetsgrazhdanstroy plant: "Make me your shareholder." It refused...

Why? This is the most interesting question! Today, under the experiment, the Vologda sovkhoz director, the agronomist, and the tractor operator are vitally, "selfishly"--in terms of the ruble--interested in giving more required products to the country. And what about construction industry workers? Builders? The industry? In what are they interested? Where does the plan and incentive push them?

I left the Vologda area with the iron conviction: Rural areas (like urban areas) today need not so much mass construction as reconstruction. A selective approach is needed. Swamps should not be drained all over, but stones should be removed from fields, shrubs should be pulled out, and roads should be built. Palaces should not be built for cows, but mechanization should be introduced into small farms and materials for their repairs should be given. This applies even to the housing problem. Everyone is nagging and crying about the housing shortage, while thousands of high-quality peasants' huts have been abandoned...

One-third of the Vologda farms are near gas pipeline routes. Gas facilities have been installed on about 7 percent. "To pierce the nipple" is a chairman's feat involving prolonged red tape. How to convince the USSR Gosplan, the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, and the Ministry of the Gas Industry that to give the plowman gas at his home, to retain him, and to grow grass or grain on his native land is more profitable than to sell the same gas abroad and to buy fodder grain there?

Previously, rural residents accepted uncomplainingly giant complexes without a feed base from builders and messed up swamps from reclamation specialists. More public money was spent and, moreover, the kolkhoz did not decide what should be built and where. Even a shed could not be built without an institute plan. Under the experiment the farms themselves approve plans valued at up to 1 million. They have the right to reconstruct themselves, not asking anybody. A tremendous relief for the manager! However, is it not as in the following anecdote: "Tell me, do I have the right...?" "You have!" "you did not listen till the end: Do I have the right...?" "You have!" "Tell me, can I...?" "You cannot!"

Everything in the economics of construction has remained according to the old way: passion for "fat volumes" and for the "utilization of funds," craving for spreading money over thousands of foundations, and aversion for small projects and for reconstruction. The manager "has the right" to reconstruct himself efficiently, but cannot.

Everything in industry has remained in the same place: gross, outlay economy; tractors instead of trailers, profitable spare parts instead of unprofitable ones, and the mania for raising prices, "smashing" rural areas, and knocking out the spirit from agroprom billions.

The chief thing has remained: the universal desire to get away and escape from the purchaser, the customer, and the client. The manager wants and has the right to receive city partners, but they do not want this.

Everyone should work on the basis of percentage of the output and profit! Everyone, not only Vologda specialists in agrarian problems! And the sooner, the better!

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CSO: 1824/424

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

INITIAL PROGRESS OF ROSTOV OBLAST AGROPROM EVALUATED

Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 33, Aug 86 p 11

[Interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Kushnarenko, chairman of the Rostov Oblast Agro-Industrial Committee, by M. Ovdiyenko, EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA correspondent: "A Great Deal Must Still Be Done"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The length of the labor service of the oblast agro-industrial committee is only several months. To be sure, however, both positive and negative processes in the formation of the oblast agroprom begin to be manifested from the first steps. What can be said in this connection?

[Answer] Although, in fact, not much time has passed from the day of the agroprom's establishment, nevertheless certain conclusions and evaluations can already be made. The committee includes the representatives of almost all oblast enterprises and organizations connected with the production and processing of agricultural products. The administrative machinery has been cut by 40 percent.

During the establishment of the committee special attention was paid to the economic planning service. Raising the level of economic work at all the agroprom's subdivisions is its basic task.

The point is that the introduction of advanced forms of labor organization and wages and improvement in the entire economic mechanism of management are simply not possible without a high-level vocational training of managers and specialists in the committee itself, in RAPO, and on farms. Personnel retraining has shown that many people have a vague idea of the principles of cost accounting and the collective contract. Yet they are called upon to be active transmitters of everything that is new.

We still have many farms, which hardly make both ends meet and sometimes are simply unprofitable. As a rule, the reasons are typical: serious omissions in production management and in the organization of and material incentives for labor. The economic services of the agroprom and RAPO have a lot of work here. This does not at all mean that all those that hopelessly lag behind in the knowledge of advanced methods of management should be retrained. Competent managers and specialists full of initiative should replace them.

Despite the fact that a single body for the management of the oblast's entire agro-industrial complex has been established, nevertheless there are still specialists at the agroprom's subdivisions, who have difficulty in getting used to the fact that they do not work in separate, autonomous departments. In brief, the psychological reorientation of even experienced personnel does not proceed as quickly as one would wish.

[Question] You have said that the agro-industrial committee includes "almost all" subdivisions and organizations connected with the production and processing of agricultural products. Well then, which of them have retained their independence?

[Answer] At the initial stage oblast managers made the proposal to abolish all departments and associations of agriculture servicing their sectors, including Rostovselstroy, Oblkolkhozstroy, and Oblselkhozhimiya associations. However, our proposal was met in the RSFSR Gosagroprom in a guarded manner. Therefore, the Scientific Production Association for Agrochemical Services to Agriculture and construction subdivisions transformed into one association--Rostovagropromstroy--still remain seemingly under the agro-industrial committee.

The problem of regulating the operation of the Scientific Production Association for Agrochemical Services to Agriculture and of the plant protection station is now very acute. In the future we would like to establish a department for chemicalization and plant protection in the oblast agroprom, centers for agrochemical services in rayons, and chemicalization stations on farms. Not much time will pass and we will realize our plan.

[Question] What are the prospects of the Rostovagropromstroy Association? The fact that it is listed as "under the committee," but, in reality, is of a dual subordination, apparently, hampers the management of rural construction in the oblast.

[Answer] As before, we think that such a situation should be changed. It is necessary to simplify the management of construction organizations both at oblast and rayon levels. Rostovagropromstroy should be a structural subdivision of the oblast agro-industrial committee and its general construction subdivisions in rayons should form part of RAPO. Only specialized organizations (installation, road, sanitary engineering, and some other organizations), construction industry enterprises, and mobile mechanized columns, which build large projects of oblast and republic significance, should be left as interrayon ones. With this alternative the management of construction will be simplified considerably, superfluous links--general construction trusts--will be liquidated, and RAPO will have more opportunities for the coordination of builders' work.

It would be correct as of next year to allocate in accordance with standards, not subdividing into a contract and an economic method, funds for building materials, machinery, and equipment against the volumes of capital investments and construction and installation work established for us with a view to distributing them among executors in localities.

[Question] The agroprom includes processing industry enterprises. What program does the oblast agroprom envisage for their accelerated development?

[Answer] This, perhaps, is our most acute problem. If we take last year, approximately 20 to 25 percent of the grown harvest did not reach consumers in the oblast owing to the fact that it could not be processed. It turns out that in our oblast the lag is not so much in agricultural production as in the processing industry.

This April, to our shame, we brought fresh cabbage (from where, do you think?) from Voronezh. How come, doesn't cabbage grow in our oblast? There is simply no place to store it—there is a shortage of vegetable storage facilities.

Here is another example. Now at the height of the season we are unable to process all milk, while a shortage of dairy products is felt in stores in some cities.

The shortage of capacities at some enterprises and their unsatisfactory utilization at others—all this is the consequence of miscalculations in the siting of enterprises throughout the oblast's zones and in their planning.

The oblast agroprom jointly with RAPO have worked out a comprehensive program for the development of APK processing sectors for 1987-1990. The capital investments allocated for the development of these sectors during this five-year plan are 2.3 times higher than during the 11th Five-Year Plan.

[Question] Nikolay Ivanovich, this program is designed for a long-term period. But what is being done today to improve the operation of processing enterprises?

[Answer] In the oblast committee the department of animal husbandry and departments of the meat and dairy industry now form a single service. Following this step, we pursue the goal of attaining primarily a full and in-depth integration of production and processing as a single integrated mechanism of management, not mechanically combining these sectors and services into one link. Problems concerning the organization of the acceptance of products directly at places of their production and central delivery by processing enterprises were singled out as immediate problems for solution.

Under the new conditions an appreciable growth of the volumes of milk accepted by dairy plants on kolkhozes and sovkhozes is ensured. More than 85 percent of the milk is now procured in such a manner, as compared to 54 percent last year. The central delivery of livestock and poultry makes up 91 percent, which is three times as much as in 1985. Work on the centralization of specialized motor transport facilities at transport enterprises of the meat and dairy industry with a view to fully changing over to the central delivery of livestock and poultry and the acceptance of milk on farms is being completed.

Departments of the food and canning industry have been unified. This service under the guidance of deputy chairman of the committee is to overall solve

problems of a sharp increase in the production of fruits and vegetables, creation of a stable raw material base for the processing industry, and implementation of a unified technical policy at all the stages of the production and sale of food products.

The food industry service is now engaged in the solution of problems connected with the specialization of farms and determination of raw material zones. Whereas previously, for example, 645 farms were engaged in potato growing, now potato production is concentrated on 40. Improvement in the organization of the delivery of vegetables and fruits to the oblast's cities through receiving-sorting centers according to the "field-store" scheme continues.

[Question] As specialists have advised me, fixed productive capital valued at 7 billion rubles is at the disposal of the oblast agroprom. What is being done so that available machines and equipment are utilized with a greater return?

[Answer] In order to improve the utilization of fixed capital, serious attention is now paid to the reconstruction and construction of the repair and service base of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and technical repair enterprises, to the technical retooling of processing sectors, and to the introduction of cost accounting in the repair and servicing of equipment.

The transport service requires a fundamental reorganization. Here we follow the path of establishment in all RAPO of independent big transport enterprises and we liquidate all small ones. They already operate in 11 RAPO.

There is also the following problem. In every rayon the service for the mechanization of animal husbandry is represented by several subdivisions duplicating each other in many respects. They are, as a rule, mobile mechanized columns, construction superintendents' and line-installation sections, and stations for the technical servicing of farm equipment. The Selenergo service exists separately. Such a lack of coordination harms the situation and gives rise to irresponsibility. We have adopted the decision to establish an enterprise for farm mechanization and production electrification in every RAPO and on its basis to unify all the mentioned allied subdivisions. In our opinion, this will contribute to an improvement in the organization at this production section.

There are problems, whose solution is not within the powers of the oblast agroprom. For example, in our opinion, the procedure of material and technical supply of agro-industrial committees needs to be improved. We consider it advisable to expand the list of products distributed by the territorial bodies of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply in localities and in the very near future to transfer agro-industrial committees to supply in the form of wholesale trade.

USSR and RSFSR state committees for material and technical supply, the agroprom's Rostpishchesnabsyrye, and the supply and sales administration of the oblast executive committee now provide raw food materials for the agroprom's processing industry according to the products list established for each of these organizations. Need one say how this complicates matters?

Apparently, the time has come to examine the problem of concentration of supply in one subdivision.

I would like to stress: Our entire work is subject to a single goal--to attain an accelerated increase in the production of all types of agricultural products and to successfully fulfill the assignments of the current year and of the five-year plan as a whole. What we have done is only a small beginning. We will still have to do a great deal of work in order to activate all the "details" of the economic mechanism. Since people activate them, it is necessary to apply maximum efforts to improve the production and cultural-domestic conditions of all workers and to ensure a rise in their occupational skills so that the human factor is manifested to a full extent.

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CSO: 1824/428

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

ROLE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES IN BELORUSSIAN APK EVALUATED

Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Aug 86 p 3

/Article by V. Kulazhenko, Doctor of Economic Sciences and V. Minich, Candidate of Economic Sciences: "Price -- An Effectiveness Factor"/

/Text/ In the recently adopted decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, entitled "Further Improvements in the Economic Mechanism for Management in the Country's Agroindustrial Complex," price formation policy and improvements in it were defined as a central means for accelerating progress. And this is quite natural. The measures for revising purchase prices and other cost levers, carried out throughout the country in conformity with the decisions handed down during the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and especially the 27th party congress, have no equal in the past either in terms of volume characteristics or number of problems encompassed. They are aimed at solving not only the problems of reproduction and inter-branch balance, but also at introducing intensive technologies, reducing expenditures and raising the efficiency of public production in all branches of the APK /agroindustrial complex/ and particularly in its principal element -- agriculture.

The experience of our republic confirms the overall positive effect which the new system of purchase prices is having on the kolkhoz and sovkhoz economies. Over the past 4 years following the decisions handed down during the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the net income of kolkhozes, for example, per 100 hectares of agricultural land, has increased from 3,200 rubles in 1982 to 17,600 rubles. The level of overall production profitability increased during this period by a factor of 4.4. Practically all of the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhozes completed the 1985 economic year with positive financial results.

The indebtedness of agricultural enterprises in terms of bank loans declined noticeably and an expansion took place in the potential of kolkhozes and sovkhozes for mobilizing resources for augmenting and bringing about quality improvements in their productive capital for economic stimulation.

In particular, direct increases in the purchase prices for livestock husbandry products, grain, potatoes, sugar beets and other products played a definite role with regard to the successes achieved. At the same time, an important lever for raising the earnings from sales for a large group of low-profitability and unprofitable farms was the mark-ups added to the prices for livestock products. In 1985 the proportion of these receipts with regard to the net income of kolkhozes in Minsk Oblast amounted to practically 25 percent.

This represented a substantial increase. But it also has a negative aspect. At the present time, the receipt of a monetary equivalent is practically guaranteed for each enterprise and it is even possible in the absence of the expected activation of economic activity. This is borne out by data which arouses some alarm: during the past 3 years (1983-1985), following the introduction of the new system of purchase prices, the level of overall profitability, without taking into account the mark-ups for low-profitability and unprofitable farms, changed only negligibly at kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Minsk Oblast: from 23.9 to 24.8 percent.

Under these conditions, a vital task is that of making extensive and creative use of economic levers for stimulating production directly out on the fields and farms of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, searching for internal reserves for accelerating economic development, supporting initiative and raising responsibility for the final result.

The internal reserves for the price factor of production efficiency are especially great. This is clearly apparent in the different manner in which prices are being employed at kolkhozes and sovkhozes throughout the republic. The role played by the price factor will increase considerably when, in conformity with the decree entitled "Further Improvements in the Economic Mechanism for Management in the Country's Agroindustrial Complex," a new system is introduced into operations for stimulating agricultural production. However, even the present system of prices and mark-ups, introduced into operations on 1 January 1983, contains many effective economic stimuli for developing initiative and searching for internal reserves for growth.

The numerous mark-ups existing at the present time for quality in the products being sold and for raising the average level of purchases for a number of types of products during the 11th Five-Year Plan make it possible for almost any kolkhoz or sovkhoz to obtain a considerably higher average sales price compared to the purchase price. Indeed the purchase prices, as a state stable norm, are based upon the average parameters for the quantity and quality of products in a particular zone. But they usually deviate from the norm to one side or another depending upon the objective conditions of management and also to a considerable degree upon those subjective factors which are exclusively dependent upon the level of management. Thus the sales prices upon which the final production result is evaluated, assuming the same purchase prices on the farms, where the level of management conforms to the modern requirements, are higher and conversely they are lower where no use is made of the economic methods of management. Moreover, the mentioned dependence quite often affects the formation of average sales prices to a stronger degree than do differences in soil fertility.

This is borne out by data obtained from kolkhozes in Slutskiy Rayon where not one farm is receiving mark-ups for operating on a low-profitability or unprofitable basis. The average sales price for 1 quintal of potatoes in 1985, at kolkhozes in the rayon having an arable land fertility of up to 36 points, was 192 rubles and at kolkhozes with a soil fertility in excess of 50 points -- only 168 rubles. The average sales price for 1 quintal of livestock (live weight) at farms with a high fertility was 235 rubles and on farms with a soil fertility on the order of 45 points -- 261 rubles.

Experience indicates that almost every agricultural enterprise, simply through the use of internal reserves, is capable of forming average sales prices for products which are higher than the state purchase prices by a factor of 1.2-1.4. For milk alone, there are four additional (with regard to the price list) channels for obtaining additional earnings from sales. These are: the differences in prices based upon the product quality, an additional payment for the sale of milk in refrigerated form, a 50 percent mark-up for exceeding the average level for the sale of products to the state during the 11th Five-Year Plan and an additional payment for converting physical weight into credited weight depending upon the actual fat content of the milk.

Just as many opportunities are embodied in the price mechanism for the production and sale of cattle and swine. Thus, four purchase price levels have been established for cattle husbandry products: according to the state of nourishment, with the upper level (for a high state of nourishment in the cattle sold) being twice as high as that for sub-standard cattle. In addition, there is also a system of mark-ups for the purchase prices for young cattle stock: 35 percent for young stock weighing from 350 to 400 kilograms and 50 percent for young stock weighing in excess of 400 kilograms.

But this is not all. For cattle and swine sold to the state, there is also a 50 percent mark-up for exceeding the average sales level achieved during the 11th Five-Year Plan.

Many farms throughout the republic are actively employing these opportunities for obtaining an additional flow of funds. More than 80-90 percent of the cattle being sold to the state by the Pervomayskiy Sovkhoz and the Soyuz Kolkhoz in Berezinskiy Rayon in Minsk Oblast are in a high state of nourishment. Moreover, the proportion of sales of heavy-weight (in excess of 400 kilograms) young stock, paid for by the state with a 50 percent mark-up, compared to the overall volume of cattle sales on these farms, is 80-87 percent. In 1985 alone, the Soyuz Kolkhoz received more than 370,000 additional rubles of earnings from the sale of cattle as a result of the 50 percent mark-up. The entire mark-up for the sale of heavy-weight cattle amounted to 385,300 rubles and this ensured more than 60 percent of the profit from the sale of cattle. The average sales price exceeded 379 rubles per quintal of live weight.

By way of comparison, the figure for Minsk Oblast was 282 rubles per quintal. However, this level is not considered to be the high level. At the Shatsk Sovkhoz in Pukhovichskiy Rayon and the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin in Krupskiy Rayon, the average sales price is 523.31 and 526.14 rubles respectively per quintal of live cattle weight. This result was achieved exclusively through the placing in operation of internal reserves. No requirement existed for an increase in the herd or for the introduction of new cattle facilities.

Obviously, it is not an easy matter to achieve such a level of organization in the raising of cattle. In this same Berezinskiy Rayon, there are farms from which cattle are delivered to the procurement points in considerably worse condition. At the Lyubushanskiy Sovkhoz, for example, the percentage of cattle which were in a lower than average or meagre state of nourishment amounted to 43.7 percent of the overall number of animals sold and those which were in a high state of nourishment -- only 30.9 percent. In 1985, beef cattle husbandry sustained losses amounting to 22,000 rubles.

Reserves for raising the proportion of high grade and refrigerated milk are even more readily available.

The kolkhozes and goskhozes in Minskiy Rayon are selling 93 percent of their milk as 1st grade quality. This is one of the republic's highest indicators. In this same rayon, the Rassvet Sovkhoz, the Pravda Goskhoz and the Kolkhoz imeni Gastello are delivering practically 100 percent of their milk as 1st grade quality. This means that all of this output is being paid for at the highest price. Moreover, this is being accomplished without the use of additional feed.

On the other hand, the losses can be substantial where an indifferent attitude is displayed. For example, the Butsevichi Sovkhoz in Minskiy Rayon, in selling only 62.8 percent of its milk as 1st grade quality and 23.4 percent as sub-standard, sustains a loss of roughly 40,000 rubles annually. Owing to a high proportion of sub-standard output, 30 tons of milk were not credited to the farm's 1985 plan. This indicates that the labor, feed and other expenditures needed to obtain this output were expended in vain.

Many of the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhozes are achieving a high and stable level of milk sales in refrigerated form. The Leninskiye Dni and Chyrvonaysa Belorussiya kolkhozes in Berezhinskiy Rayon and the Put K Kommunizmu Kolkhoz in Minskiy Rayon are selling more than 90 percent of their milk in refrigerated form. This is making it possible for them to obtain 50,000 rubles of additional earnings. Accordingly, the sales prices at such farms are high. For example, the average sales price for a quintal of milk at the Chyrvonaysa Belorussiya Kolkhoz was 55 rubles. But this is not the limit. In Minsk Oblast there are some farms on which the average sales price is on the order of 56-61 rubles per quintal. The Shatsk Sovkhoz in Pukhovichskiy Rayon, the Semkovo and Chudenichi sovkhozes in Logoyskiy Rayon and others are selling milk at prices which are in excess of 58 rubles per quintal.

However, it is unfortunate that there are many examples of mismanagement in the use of the true potential for raising the profitability of the dairy branch. Thus the Minsk Vegetable Factory and the Kolkhoz imeni Engels in this same rayon are refrigerating only one third of their milk. The Novyy Put and Rogovskiy sovkhozes in Minskiy Rayon are refrigerating only slightly more than one half of their milk.

It is noted that there is an average of one refrigeration unit for each farm in Minskiy Rayon. However, only slightly more than 70 percent of the milk is being sold in refrigerated form.

Experience indicates that milk can be cooled also by using spring water and ice in addition to refrigeration units. Such methods are being employed at the Put K Kommunizmu Kolkhoz and the Rassvet Sovkhoz in this same rayon. By displaying a truly thrifty attitude in carrying out this work, 93-95 percent of the marketable milk is being cooled using one refrigeration unit for every 4-5 farms. A further search for internal reserves for carrying out this work is not out of the question.

In the formation of profitability for dairy cattle husbandry, an important role is played by another economic stimulus, one which is embodied in the mechanism

for management and in the price mechanism -- stimulating an increase in the fat content of milk. Last year, the fat content of milk at kolkhozes and goskhozes in Minsk Oblast amounted to an average of 3.72. The task of exceeding the basic fat content by tenths and even hundredths of a percent is of great importance to a farm. This is convincingly borne out by the practice of a number of farms in Minskiy Rayon. For example, in 1985 the Bolshevik Sovkhoz exceeded the 1984 figure for milk fat content by 0.1 percent and the additional payment for raising the quality of the output amounted to approximately 20,000 rubles. The Kolkhoz imeni Gastele raised the fat content of its milk by only 0.05 percent and received more than 25,000 additional rubles. Moreover, exceeding the basic fat content serves as the basis for converting the physical weight of the output into the credited weight. In recent years, the Rassvet Sovkhoz has been selling its output with a fat content of not lower than 4 percent. Last year, following a conversion over to basic fat content, the physical weight for the farm's plan was credited with more than 460 additional tons and this was equivalent to maintaining still another dairy farm of 150 head with a milk yield of 3,000 kilograms annually!

The reserves for raising the average sales price are for all practical purposes inexhaustible. They are to be found at almost every kolkhoz and sovkhoz and for every type of marketable product and for both livestock husbandry and field crop husbandry. The placing in operation of these reserves will result in prices being used as a factor for production efficiency and as an effective element for the entire economic mechanism and for production intensification.

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CSO: 1824/457

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

USSR GOSAGROPROM REMOTE SENSING SUBDIVISION FORMED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Aug 86 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Complete Diagnosis- from Flying laboratory"]

[Text] A new subdivision of USSR GOSAGROPROM has been put into operation--the All-Union Scientific-Research Center "AIUS-AGRORESURSY" [Automated Information Control System--Agricultural Resources]. Center activities are being conducted within the framework of the "Kosmos" state science and technology program.

With aerospace support, an evaluation is made of the condition of agricultural lands and plantings, reservoirs, and forest plantations. Through remote sensing, the density of stands, weed infestation and degree of blight can be assessed. Areas of flooding and soil salinization can be identified, as well as the quality of field operations. A more accurate prognosis of major crop harvests is possible.

The Center has its own modern remote sensing apparatus. Aeroflot provides specialized aircraft equipped with laboratories, as well as small An-2 aircraft and helicopters. Powerful computer complexes process the aerospace information in the "AGRORESURSY" system.

In Krasnodar, Tashkent, Saransk, Tselinograd and Kiev territorial units collect and process the necessary data. Such information assists regional APK management organs in resolving many problems.

The All-Union Scientific-Research Center "AIUS-AGRORESURSY" is operating in close collaboration with institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences and VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin]. Agricultural specialists, pilots and cosmonauts will conduct joint operations there.

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CSO: 1824/464

AGRO-ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION

ECONOMIST URGES MORE CONTROLS IN UZBEK PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

[Editorial Report] K. Saydov, doctor of economic sciences and chairman of the Samarkand State University political economy department, contributes an article in Tashkent EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 7, July 1986, pages 58-61, in which he discusses the growth of the private sector in Uzbek agriculture and suggests improvements.

The article cites figures showing that by the end of the 11th FYP Uzbek private plots produced 47 percent of the meat, 64 percent of the milk, 40 percent of the eggs, 32 percent of the karakul, 62 percent of the wool, 32 percent of the potatoes, 48 percent of the vegetables, and 52 percent of the melon crops--of the gross output in all sectors of the Uzbek economy. It is indicated, however, that of the total state procurement of basic agricultural products in Uzbekistan at the end of the 11th FYP, the share of private plot production amounted to: cattle and poultry, 13 percent; milk, 8 percent; eggs, 9 percent; wool, 60 percent; karakul, 68 percent; vegetables, 36 percent; and melon crops, 46 percent.

According to Saydov, contract relations between private plot developers and agricultural enterprises require further clarification. These relations are often voluntary, with the result that hugh violations of procurement principles are tolerated. Money is sometimes collected from the population instead of livestock products.

The desire by some Uzbek private plot developers for private enrichment is detrimental to the public economy, Saydov states. For example, he mentions the presence of an excessive number of cattle on private plots, which has entailed the consumption of more feed than can be supplied. Private plot developers often devote their energies completely to their own pursuits, disregarding the public interest. In spite of huge labor resources in Uzbek rural areas, sovkhozes and kolkhozes must depend on aid from city residents and students in stress times.

The author calls for a clear-cut plan of mutual relations between consumer unions, sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and the private sector under GOSAGROPROM management and its local subdivisions. He also recommends that rural soviets take a decisive role in private plot management by regulating the hugh potential of the private sector and applying incentives.

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24 November 1986